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ABSTRACT
This thesis evaluates the opportunities and pitfalls of partnerships between the state and
illegal subdividers, in the development of land for the poor. Illegal subdivider, also
known as dalals in the subcontinent, have for the last decade been the predominant
suppliers of land for the poor. They have been most successful in channeling unclaimed
or disputed public and private land for the poor through petty commercial subdivision.
The Incremental Development Scheme, in Hyderabad, Sindh, was an experimental
initiative by the Hyderabad Development Authority (HDA), that responded to the
concern that land delivery to the poorest is decreasing in even such illegal sub-markets,
caused by growing scarcity of land and burgeoning demand. Along with phasing land
development costs, the agenda of the scheme was to combine the marketing and
development experience of dalals, with state projects targeting the poor.
This thesis investigates i) the positive and unique contributions of the alliance between
the state and dalals that overcome barriers to traditional state or subdivider developed
schemes, ii) the factors affecting tenure security for users and dalals, iii) the feasibility of
land and housing policies targeting the poorest exclusively, iv) the physical layout
implications of incremental development schemes.
While it is not possible to comprehensively estimate the costs and benefits of joint
development by the market and the state, the Incremental Development Scheme achieves
three significant results that are likely to have important bearing on future policy. First,
the combination of tenure and procedural restrictions was instrumental in encouraging
new owner-occupiers over owner non-occupiers. This is a valuable insight into
techniques of controlling rampant speculation. The second unique achievement of the
scheme was that it was able to sustain access for the poorest even when the project had
matured and was desirable to higher bidders. Lastly, the Incremental Development
Scheme successfully lead development on the urban fringe, perhaps a future prototype of
state guided urban growth.
Thesis Advisor: Omar M. Razzaz
Title: Visiting Lecturer, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Amongst the most pressing problems of rapidly growing cities in developing countries, is
the growing shortage of affordable land. The inability of both state and market
mechanisms to adequately meet the burgeoning demand, has sparked a debate about
whether the state should act as a developer or remain an enabler of the (informal) market.
Historically, the failure of sites and services schemes, and the subsequent success of illegal
commercial land subdivisions, provided the justifications for the withdrawal of the state
from direct land development. Increasingly, the expanding demand for land for the poor
was left to be met through the illegal petty commercial subdivision of unclaimed public or
private land. The role for development agencies was limited to the provision of essential
infrastructure and legal title. Indeed researchers have argued for active support of such sub
markets, that by non-conformity to planning standards and laws regarding land
transactions, have been able to provide access to the poorest. This argument suggests that
the future role of the state should be to further enable the market by removing
administrative and financial barriers for producers, and opening of new land for
development (Gilbert 90).
On the other hand, the decreased effectiveness of informal subdivisions in targeting the
poor, has caused the consideration of a more active direct role for the state. First, as land
has got scarce, investigators have noticed the infiltration of demands of higher income
groups, both for speculation and use, into illegal sub-markets that previously served the
poor (Doebele 87). The argument suggests that the increased costs due to scarcity are
passed on disproportionately to the poorest. Second, improvements in tenure security,
location and layout, have reduced the uncertainties of living in illegal settlements which had
previously rendered them more affordable than formally provided land (Durand-Lasserve
90). Thirdly, in addition to the displacement of the poorest, the network of patronage and
power brokering between illegal subdividers and politicians on the one hand threatens the
authority of the state, and on the other increases the probability of coercion of beneficiaries
(Linden 92: 53, Schoorl et al 83). Lastly, the literature notes the lost opportunities and
increased costs of post-facto upgrading, of uncoordinated and randomly located illegal
subdivisions (Doebele 83, Baross 90). A more proactive prescription for the state
recognizes the opportunities and limitations of the present form of land delivery, and the
diminishing control and initiative of planning agencies. One method calls for formalizing
the informal land delivery process, by the state mimicking the positive features of
commercial land subdivision in state managed land delivery (Baross 90, Ward 90,
Steinberg 90, Linden 89, Hasan 90).
In this thesis, I will evaluate one of the first cases where a serious effort was made by a
development agency to incorporate features of informal subdivision processes into its
implementation strategy-- the Incremental Development Scheme (IDS) of the Hyderabad
Development Authority (HDA), in Sindh, Pakistan. Empowered to act flexibly, the HDA
planned to both learn from, and work with developers of informal settlements, to fulfill its
own agenda of selectively targeting the poorest households (belonging to the lowest tenth
percentile of income). Renamed Khuda ki Basti by its inhabitants, the IDS case reveals
the opportunities and limitations of the state's attempts to insert itself into the fragile and
opportunistic mode of illegal subdividing. As predicted by Tasneem Siddiqui, the director
of the HDA, the very process of collaboration caused the HDA to share its authority with
the dalals it hoped to formalize. In general, more accurately, the outcome of the experiment
was a case of dalals (informal developers) informalizing the formal transacting of the HDA
rather than the other way around.
I will argue that the outcome of the IDS suggests mixed results. The IDS experience
illustrates that the inclusion of dalals in a formal state controlled process is not a panacea for
housing the poor. On the other hand, given the limited options available in HDA's
circumstances, the IDS does define channels along which bargaining and negotiation
between different actors in the process might occur in the future. Another important lesson
from the case is that the altering circumstances along the path of development require the
state to be able to modify and revise its own goals and strategies continuously.
This paper is based on secondary material collated through a series of researches on the
project.2 While previous cases have judged the project in aggregate terms, my intention is
1Urdu for "God's Own Settlement".
2The primary material consists of a HDA documentation by Siddiqui, 1988, a case study by Van der Linden
in 1989, an evaluation report by Arif Hasan in the following year, Adnan Aliani's report for UNCHS,
to understand the transformation of state agendas through the implementation of the project,
in order to indicate the features of the project that the state might be expected to improve
upon in the future. What were the relatively more successful aspects of the scheme? Is the
project worth it?
In the remainder of this chapter, I will introduce the context and assumptions behind the
formulation of the goals for the IDS, and will compare them with those of conventional
sites and services schemes. I was surprised to see that the effectiveness of the HDA to
control and implement the project differed dramatically in the land development phase and
the phase of incremental infrastructure delivery. The structure of the thesis is intended to
separate these two phases.
In Chapter II, the focus will be on a detailed recounting of the interactions between the
HDA and dalals (developer/ subdividers). I will argue that informal subdividers and the
state have continuously changing incentives to cooperate or compete with each other, and
that their respective goals may or may or may not coincide. This chapter will describe
chronologically the evolution of implementation mechanisms necessitated by different
stages of land delivery in the four sectors of the scheme. I will illustrate the inability of the
state to either disengage or control dalals to remain accountable, once they have been
included in the development process. On the other hand, this chapter will investigate the
positive and unique contributions of the alliance between the state and dalals that overcome
barriers to traditional state or subdivider developed schemes.
Chapter III relies upon two beneficiary surveys conducted three and four years after the
initiation of the IDS3. In the first of three sections, I. will assess the outcomes of the IDS
with respect to the targeting criteria initially formulated by the HDA. The second section in
this chapter examines the characteristics of user participation, and the barriers to formation
of beneficiary organizations around demonstrated needs for incremental infrastructure
provision. The concluding section of chapter III highlights the reasons for the failure of the
HDA to retain control over beneficiaries by merely restricting tenure. In this section, I take
a broader look at what factors affect tenure security for users and dalals. I argue that the
management of tenure security entails the provision of amenities that enable the use of the
site by the beneficiaries.
1991, and a chapter from Akhtar Badshah's Phd disseration, MIT, 1992, besides several shorter articles in
newspapers and journals. (Refer bibliography).
3Van der Linden, 1989, and Arif Hasan, 1990.
1. Khuda-ki-Basti: Aerial View
In conclusion, Chapter IV, recasts the shortfalls and achievements of the project, identified
in preceding chapters, in terms of their replicability. In the penultimate section, I examine
the opportunities, pitfalls, and alternatives of adopting a policy of land subsidies for the
poorest. Questions for future inquiry are posed. Critical to the relevance and implement
ability of land development on the urban periphery is the realization that the state cannot and
perhaps should not expect to restrict its beneficiaries to a particular sub-market. Instead, it
should explore the possibility of coordination of incentives of different actors in the
process. The final section in this chapter explores the physical implications of the
institutional parameters of the scheme.
HDA's Rationale for Working with Dalals
Rampant speculation and the acute shortage of land for the poor, prompted the Hyderabad
Development Authority (HDA) to launch an experimental project whose agenda and
implementation approach was derived from an assessment of the characteristics of informal
settlements in Karachi and Hyderabad, as well as HDA's own earlier failure with sites and
services schemes. The HDA sites and services projects were criticized for being
insignificant gestures in the face of high demand, for not having reached the target group,
and for their limited replicability.
On the other hand, Siddiqui, the director of the HDA, observed that informal "commercial"
subdividers (dalals) were the only providers of low income shelter in Hyderabad.
Characteristically, dalals were able to develop affordable shelter on encroached land
without paying for the land itself. Other methods for reducing entry costs already used by
illegal subdividers in Hyderabad included a practice of cross-subsidizing of plots for the
poorest, by "banking" land for speculation (Siddiqui 1988: 7). Also, the costs of services
were deferred by the dalal in anticipation of government upgrading, thereby further
minimizing costs.4
Unlike informal subdivisions, HDA bureaucratic procedures typically required applicants to
wait (sometimes for years) before a plot was allotted to them. On the other hand, it was in
the interest of dalals to settle users immediately, because the bulk of the profits accrued on
4 The costs of upgradation are usually borne by the government in return for the political support of
constituencies that live in these settlements. Further, in anticipation of upgradation, subdividers divide the
site in a grid-iron layout to facilitate the provision of infrastructure.
the appreciated value of land reserved for sale after the settlement was inhabited.5 The
HDA hoped to use this marketing and implementation incentive of the dalals. In addition,
the HDA agenda was enlarged to provide credit and building services (in conjunction with
access to land), because they contributed to the successful record of the dalals. Another set
of justifications for mimicking the informal sector was based upon the incentive to recover
land costs. Hasan observed that nearly 60% of the end costs to the user was made up of
bribes paid by the subdivider to enforcement agents, and another 20% consisted of the
dalals profits. The HDA felt that by controlling the land delivery itself, it could lower these
costs for the user by eliminating most of the transaction costs incurred by dalals. In
addition, by directly distributing plots, HDA could simultaneously recover the raw land
costs from the allottees.
In sum, The HDA argument in favor of targeting the poorest was that they were priced out
of the bidding for land because all land that came into the market was immediately
speculated upon by more "powerful" interests. The HDA wanted to protect the users from
coercion and manipulation of users by dalals, and rising rents in illegal settlements6. I
speculate that the experience of the Orangi Pilot Project, in Karachi, were important in
kindling the equity concerns of the HDA.
HDA's challenge was to co-opt the dalal's initiative, and simultaneously achieve targeted
development through the control of speculation
5Plots to widows and other disabled are given free to settle people as quickly as possible (Badshah1992:
253).
6The average rent in informal settlements for a single room with utilities is Rs. 293, about a third of the
lowest tenth percentile household income (Linden 89).
Chapter II
INTERACTION WITH DALALS IN LAND DELIVERY
Beneficiary Selection : Evolution of the Policy
The process of beneficiary selection stands out in the IDS project as compared to its
conventional Sites and Services predecessors. On the surface, it is the most direct
intervention by the HDA on the market distribution of land. The concept of beneficiary
selection is to avoid speculation by allotting land to poor users who demonstrate their need.
In the IDS, individuals of higher income groups were to be deterred by a requirement to
reside in the reception area which was undesirable and demeaning to them. It is interesting
however that the HDA mostly found itself reacting to professional speculators (like illegal
subdivides and local politicians), in the same way as it might with private interests in the
"formal" sector.
As already noted earlier, the implementation strategy and goals for the IDS evolved with the
experience gained in each phase of development. The Incremental Development Scheme is
made up of four sectors of equal size7, D-6, E-4, E-3, and D-3, executed in that order.
Also, in terms of beneficiary selection, the entire project can be understood to have
emerged in three stages. The earliest stage, sector D-6, resembled a conventional Sites and
Services approach. Services were to be provided incrementally as the beneficiaries were
able to pay for them. Like the Sites and Services concept, the HDA set out to award
immediate freehold title to its beneficiaries in a bid to give security of tenure, which in turn
was supposed to encourage users to invest incrementally, first in the betterment of their
properties, and later in shared infrastructure. The selection procedure for the first stage
was that HDA invited local political leaders and social workers from neighboring squatter
7Each sector had an identical gridded layout plan and occupied the same area with between 700 and 800 equal
sized plots. The four sectors, together known as the Khuda ki Basti, Incremental Development Scheme,
were part of the low income housing component of the 52 sector Gulshan-ai-Shahbaz scheme.
CONCEPT PLAN GULSHAN-E-SHAHBAZ, SHOWING THE LOCATION
OF THE INCREMENTAL- DEVELOPMENT SCHEME
SIND UNIVERSITY
TOLPLAZA/
Hyderabad.
Gulsban-e-Shabhar
2. Site Plans
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settlements to identify deserving applicants. However, this strategy also invited subversion
by the same "local representatives".
During HDA's early attempts, households did not settle in Khuda ki Basti, although
- or should we say because?- they had been identified by councilors and 'social
workers' as the ones eager to go and live in HDA's scheme. (Linden 89: 15)
The failure of Sector D-6, led to the development of sectors E-4 first, and later E-3, where
the HDA had to reconsider its ability to monitor infringement of speculators from both
within and outside the project. In this second stage, the HDA officially engaged a dalal as a
middleman to select allottees on their behalf. Also, in a bid to extend its ability to eliminate
those applicants that did not comply with guidelines, the HDA delayed the awarding of title
to the selected beneficiaries. Sector D-3 represents the final stage of evolution of the
scheme. Finding that its selection criteria still left loopholes which the dalals took
advantage of, the HDA set up a reception area, where applicants were monitored closely
before being allotted a plot on the same restricted terms developed in the second stage.
This chapter describes the role of the principal actors (the HDA, dalals, leaders and social
workers, and beneficiaries) in the shaping of the objectives and implementation strategies
of the scheme. I relate the critical instances and circumstances where one or all of these
actors transformed the scheme's targeting process and policies.
Stage I, Sector D-6: Breaking the development deadlock
In the earliest phase of IDS development, in sector D-6 in 1986, the HDA requested local
councilors, and social workers8 operating in squatter settlements in the nearby Kotri
industrial area to help identify families who lived there but did not own any property
themselves. The HDA rationale was that local community leaders and subdivides had
access to poor users living in areas similar to the IDS. The HDA felt that "local leaders"
would be able to identify deserving candidates in their localities better than HDA staff based
on the following criteria (Hasan, 90):
i) Selected applicants own no other property elsewhere. (Applicants were required to fill
8 The so called social workers were usually self appointed and used this designation to further personal
goals. Social workers were usually building contractors in the informal settlement, and also traded in petty
patronage (Linden 89: 15).
an affidavit to that effect when they made their formal application, along with a photocopy
of the household head's National Identity card.)
ii) The selected beneficiaries be actual residents of the neighboring settlement (of the
'leaders') and not false applicants living elsewhere. (The HDA was aware that proximity to
jobs was an important criteria for low income people9.)
iii) Only heads of families (not individual bridge-headers) living on less than 120 sq. ft. of
land were eligible to apply.
HDA's initial selection process failed to reach the target income group in Sector D-6. The
HDA gave each selected applicant title upon receiving a down payment, and required them
to build a house within one year. The beneficiaries had little problem with coming up with
the down payment of Rs.460 (or the following installments). Only twenty of the three
hundred allottees, however, actually honored their commitment to build and live on the site.
The applicants tended to be employed near or in the adjacent industrial area, Kotri, and
returned to living near their place of employment after they had possession of the plot.
Once the freehold title had been received, the allottee was under little obligation to acquiesce
to HDA regulations. The requirement to build within one year, had been subverted by the
very "social workers" and leaders the HDA had conferred with.
The HDA conclusion that immediate distribution of titles had allowed speculation to occur
was probably correct. Hasan's survey in 1990 shows that of all residents in the IDS, those
of this sector were the richest, belonging to the lower-middle income group (Hasan 90:
appendix 3/4). Only 30% were resident owners, and a majority of the owners in 1990 had
bought their plots on resale 10. It would be appropriate to point out however that only 15%
of the owners surveyed in 1990 had purchased their plot directly from a dalal. Though the
actual number of respondents to the question- who the plot had been purchased from- is
9The outcomes of the tradeoff between cheap land at the urban periphery and proximity to jobs (usually at
more expensive locations in the center of the city) may be an important indicator of the range of choices
available to different actors. While the choice for the fresh (bridge-header) migrant is constrained by
opportunities for entry into the job market, most development agencies are constrained by the unavailability
of cheap land in the center of the city. In the IDS, the HDA was attempting to ensure that the selected
applicants had already made the choice to live at the periphery of the city, at a similar location. Hasan's
survey records that IDS users were spending at least 20% of their income on transportation, even when the
government (SRTC) buses had been augmented by private vans.
10Though all the plots had been sold by the HDA in 1986, Hasan's survey shows that 70% of the owners
(in 1990) had actually bought their plots in the two years (1987, '88) following. From 1989 onwards, the
turnover rate had dropped dramatically, with only 5% of the residents buying plots '89 and'90.
smalll 1, the above figures are an indication that not all plots had been speculated upon by
professional speculators alone. Nearly one quarter of the lots had been resold by the
original allottees, who had no need to stay in Khuda ki Basti themselves. Beneficiary
selection in sector D-6 was therefore not only subverted by professional speculative
interests like those of dalals, but more importantly failed to identify truly needy users (who
had no other alternative to locate.) Consistent with other indicators of relative affluence,
the density (of occupied plots) in D-6 (5.6 persons/plot) is the lowest amongst all sectors of
the IDS (7.00-7.86 persons/plot). Without power to enforce its selection rules, the HDA
requirements had become an ineffective wish list.
By 1990, when the survey was conducted, many permanent two storeyed houses were
constructed though several remained empty throughout the Khuda ki Basti. Hasan's study
indicates that prior to coming to sector D-6, most of the residents in 1990 were renters
(50%), while the rest were either living with relations (25%), or second houseowners
(25%). None of the beneficiaries were previously house owners. Thus almost four years
after its inception, sector D-6 shows evidence of the filtering up of the housing stock, and
the creation of rental housing.
Though the HDA goal of targeting failed, the fact that development and construction in
sector D-6 was initiated at all, was an unusual achievement. None of HDA's formal
development efforts in the surrounding Gulshan-ai-Shahbaz scheme had actually induced
construction, even for the middle and high income groups. HDA's association with local
councilors, social workers and dalals in D-6, had spurred development interest. "The hunt
for land" (Linden '89: 15) was initiated through the competing interests of these informal
subdivides despite the arid and remote location, poor and expensive transportation links,
and non-existent infrastructure and job market. Though the site had inherent disadvantages
for formal development, this was'a typical situation in which informal subdivides, if given
access, might thrive12. HDA's request to select deserving beneficiaries was converted by
the leaders and social workers into a tacit invitation to speculate on agency owned land.
Realizing that their targeting had failed, and knowing that there was little that could be done
to enforce its requirements, the HDA withdrew their involvement from the sector, and
preferred to begin a new phase in sector E-4, at a considerable distance from D-6 (so that
I1 Hasan 90 : 55. Table 3.3
12The HDA experience in Sector D-6 was not new. Linden records that whenever government agencies
(both in Hyderabad and Karachi) had publicly announced such schemes, speculators had been quick to get
control of as many plots as they could within the scheme and even the surrounding land.
the next phase would be perceived as a different project, with new rules.) However, while
the speculators subverted the HDA to gain entry into the settlement, they needed the HDA
to fulfill its part of the contract (the installation of infrastructure). Interestingly, and
contrary to conventional expectations, amongst all block organizations 13, those of sector
D-6 were best organized. The incentive to organize was brought about by the withdrawal
of the HDA from sector D-6. Owners were forced to organize to ensure the infrastructure
(they paid for) was installed. In addition, their effectiveness was enhanced by the fact that
they had greater resources (Aliani 91, Hasan 90). Given that they had been originally
identified (in many cases installed) by local subdivides (dalals), leaders, and social workers
with speculative interests, it is not unlikely that their resources and influence would have
been used to develop the sector.
To recapitulate, the development of sector D-6 needs to be evaluated differently than the
other sectors. First, unlike the following stages of the project, the HDA was faced with
breaking a deadlock in the urban periphery, where no construction investment or actual use
had occurred despite the sale of a large number of plots. This was accomplished
specifically because of the speculative interests of local leaders, social workers and dalals.
Secondly, the HDA relied heavily, and somewhat presumptuously, on the good will and
selflessness of social workers, leaders, and dalals to market the plots. Thirdly, though the
allotees in this stage were not from the HDA target group, they did produce and let into the
market some rental housing stock. Lastly, it is only through the actual implementation of
sector D-6 that the -HDA actually started defining who their target group were. The
discussion of the selected group I will pick up later in the next chapter. At present, it is
sufficient to note that the HDA assumed that the non-owner residents of an informal
settlement near the scheme closely matched the eligibility criteria for candidates for targeted
development.
1 3 Community groups organized originally by the HDA consisted of residents of a "block" (ranging from
100 to 250 plots). These organizations were created by the HDA in order to facilitate the installation and
management of services and the administration of loans. Each sector had between two and six such
community groups.
(Hasan 90: 28)
Stage II, Sector E-4: Mediation by the Dalal
The HDA had to increasingly contend with the rampant speculation and encroachment that
had begun in the area. Its agenda for the next phase, E-4, included stricter screening of
applicants, and on the ground, more effective control against outright invasion of its land.
Consistent with its initial concept of learning from the informal subdivision process, the
HDA engaged the services of a dalal as a middleman to act on its behalf in sector E-414.
The dalal's first initiative was to pre-empt other illegal subdivides by initiating development
on land that was threatened by encroachment.
When the whole area of the scheme was still vacant, several illegal subdivides
attempted to establish claims to the land. The middleman then engaged a gang of
laborers and had the foundation trenches of a number of corner plots dug and bricks
deposited on the spot in the middle of the night. Immediately after this, noticing
that development was about to start, customers for adjacent plots showed up. The
middleman sold these plots to them on the condition that they would start to
construct their houses without delay. He sold the bricks to these customers and
took contracts for the construction. He kept the eventually most valuable corner
plots for himself. (Linden 1989: 16)
The dalal not only resisted pressure from other subdivides but also from other public
agencies 15. Indeed there was a situation where the dalal was actually arrested by the police
on a complaint from "another public agency". Certainly, though this ordeal was not
unfamiliar for an illegal subdivider, it was something no HDA employee would endure.
14Linden suggests that there may have been few choices for HDA in the matter. Speculators had
aggressively started encroaching on HDA land which the small and underpaid security of the HDA would be
unable to resist.
15Though the specific agency is not identified in the literature, there is mention of several agencies whose
agendas conflicted with those of the HDA's at several points. Prominent amongst those mentioned at other
points, are the State Road Transport Corporation, who was slow in extending bus routes to Khuda ki Basti,
and the Electricity Board, whose functionaries were reluctant to distribute connection permits without
bribes. There is also a reference made to a public agency which had a disputed claim on the land at one edge
of the Gulshan-ai-Shahbaz scheme. Linden also describes how the "patwari", the local official incharge of
registering and maintaining land records, was susceptible to corruption, and was therefore amenable to
altering records in favor of illegal subdividers and local landlords ("wadheras") who were attempting to
encroach into HDA land.
The dalal in both these cases kept development from stalling in ways that the HDA did not
have the institutional capacity to prevent. Disputed land, (especially between government
agencies with equivalent power), as that wrested by the dalal, is prime for illegal takeover.
Legal and bureaucratic procedures would freeze the possibility of any development, at the
very least. These cases are examples of how the dalal positively aided the project by
actually subverting government institutions and procedures. Paradoxically, this
undermining of State procedures actually enabled the HDA to be more responsive to illegal
threats of invasion of government land. Moreover, the dalal, had enhanced HDA's
institutional capability, while deriving legitimacy by associating with the HDA. The
conventional view that the illegal subdivider is always in confrontation with the state
agency is therefore not always true. Also, this case illustrates that the stream of benefits of
association with illegal subdivides does not flow in one direction only. The HDA too was
effectively obligated to the dalal in this case, a condition that the dalal took advantage of
through cloaked speculation (as described above), and simultaneous extraction of official
construction contracts from the HDA, in the next phase 16.
When the reception area had become institutionalized, the middleman constructed its
temporary reed matting shelters. Together with some others the middleman also
undertook the construction of some 200 mud brick single-roomed houses in Khuda
ki Basti, which he sold to households preferring such a house over an empty plot...
When HDA decided that the reception area [introduced later in the next phase; pt]
should include some solid two-roomed houses, a building contract was awarded to
the same middleman. (Linden 89: 16)
Regaining Control by Prolonging Insecurity of Applicants
The outcome of Sector E-4 at first was predictably not different from that of sector D-6.
The dalal was asked to identify prospective beneficiaries from a settlement near Kotri (the
adjoining industrial area) using the same criteria established earlier by the HDA in sector D-
6. This time, the HDA withheld title from the allottees conditional on construction and
occupation of a house within three months. The HDA's move to retain the title deeds was
16The ability of the dalal to successfully bid for petty construction projects grew with his increasingly
recognizable involvement in the scheme. This need not only be because of his ability to extract favors
from the HDA, but also because he was positioned to be in the right place at the right time. I speculate
that the fact that the dalal was recognized by the director of the HDA, gave tacit authority to the junior staff
to award small jobs to him. On the other hand, when the HDA canceled his contract to construct houses,
the dalal reacted strongly by petitioning the Prime minister of Pakistan to allow him to build more houses,
on the plea that the subdivider would invest the profits into community facilities (Linden 89: 17).
meant to discourage speculators, and at the same time was a way of retaining power over
the applicants long enough to ensure that the HDA guidelines were met. Essentially, the
delaying of the awarding of the title deed was equivalent to extending the period of
insecurity of the applicants.
However, HDA's intention to extend its power to regulate beneficiaries was put to test
almost immediately. In the face of its record of consistent failure to administer its own
mandate in previous developments, (including the recent sector D-6), many occupiers of
land (especially the dalal himself!) felt secure enough to flout HDA guidelines. When no
development took place, HDA canceled previous allotments and re-issued those plots with
the stipulation that construction begin on them immediately. Hasan's survey 17, reflects the
re allotment process, as it records a sharp increase in the number of people who purchased
their plots from the HDA directly (up to 75% in E-4 from 60% in D-6). This result
suggests that the HDA empowered itself in two ways: first, that the cancellation process
had increased the possibility of the HDA delivering land directly to beneficiaries without
intermediaries, and consequently second, that the cancellation plots was a possible
instrument of (partial) control for the HDA over dalals. Naturally, the move provoked
dissent, particularly from the party that stood the most to lose -- the dalal. The dalal's
resistance and coercion of the enforcement mechanism of the HDA is discussed later.
Suffice it to note that as the cancellation of plots by the HDA was unprecedented and
forcefully executed; it was effective because of its element of surprise.
Along with its decision to delay the awarding of title, the HDA also officially restricted the
right to transfer property, except by inheritance. The intention here was to minimize the
trading of subsidized land for profit. The only legal recourse for allottees was to resell their
plot through the HDA, who would charge a "transfer fee", similar to a capital gains tax, for
the transaction. This transfer fee, is effectively a mechanism for the HDA to share the
appreciation in property values. The task of collection was later ceded by the HDA to block
organizations, with the rationale that the revenues so generated would be directed back to
the settlement to pay for improvements and community facilities. The terms of tenure for
the plot had therefore changed from the awarding of an unconditional freehold title (in the
first stage, sector D-6), to a delayed (conditional) awarding of a freehold title (earlier in
sector E-4), to finally, (later in the second stage) a deed limiting the right to profit from the
equity. The restriction on this crucial "stick" in the bundle of rights, was an attempt to
further discourage speculation. Even though the evolution of tenure arrangements in the
17(Hasan 90: 52-84; Appendix 3/4)
IDS was a significant landmark in terms of the redefinition of state objectives, these
rephrased rights relied more heavily upon the HDA's capability to ensure compliance from
defaulters.
The absentee owners of one row of mud brick houses had hired a lady from the
area who every evening put padlocks on the doors of all the houses, to unlock them
again the next morning. Thus the impression was created that all the houses were
inhabited. Somehow, the case came to be known by HDA's staff and the plots
were canceled. (Linden 89: 22)
The repeated willingness of the subdivides to "gamble" with HDA's enforcement ability,
and their relative success in bypassing HDA's regulations in Sector D-6, proves Siddiqui's
assertion that informal subdivisions are increasingly catering to lower-middle income
groups (rather than the low income groups) in Hyderabad. More importantly, it
demonstrates the ability of the dalals to not only respond to market demand, but also to
induce development by infiltrating HDA's scheme through fake applicants, the bribing and
co-optation of site staff, and even outright encroachment. On the other hand, the HDA
used the dalals to enter the informal market and attempted essentially to compete with them
by (hopefully) providing alternative location arrangements for the target users. To do this,
HDA had to compromise its authority and include (and tolerate), manage, and even directly
oppose market forces and agents. The finesse with which the dalal was able to use and
subvert the HDA is yet another demonstration of the power and experience of informal
networks in dealing with government authority.
Stage III, Sector E3 & D3: Filtering Applicants who Demonstrate Need
The final stage of evolution of the land delivery strategy (in sectors E-3 and D-318), was
both a tactic to enhance HDA's ability to regulate the growing number of conflicting actors
in Khuda ki Basti, and also to ensure that the increasingly desirable neighborhood remained
accessible to the target group. Linden strongly suspects that the idea for the reception area
originated from the dalal. In an effort to circumvent and pressure HDA's increasingly
demanding allotment procedure, the dalal advised a family to squat on the site with all their
belongings. The dalal's reasoning was that such an overt demonstration of need would be
18Small numbers of reallocated plots in sectors D-6 and E-4 were also distributed to beneficiaries who used
the reception area.
enough of a plea for the HDA to short-cut the lengthening HDA procedure. Realizing that
it was becoming increasingly difficult to control the speculative actions of dalals, the HDA
sought to take control of the development by screening the beneficiaries itself. In order to
do this, a distinct reception area was setup where prospective applicants were monitored
directly by HDA staff for a period of fifteen days. The prospective applicants had the
option of living in their own makeshift accommodation or rent shelter (for Rs. 100 for the
fortnight19), in a small piece of land adjacent to but distinct from the Khuda ki Basti sector
(where plots were to be allotted).
The HDA required that the beneficiaries demonstrate their need by actually living in the
reception area in the same circumstances they would be expected to live if they were allotted
a plot in the IDS. At the start, the reception area was a success as over 350 families moved
into the Khuda ki Basti through the reception area. The prime purpose of the HDA seems
to have been to avoid speculation by ensuring that only real users apply (and get) plots in
the IDS20. The HDA was also conscious that the tedious application process required by
state promoted housing programs was a barrier to entry for the target group. Hence
consistent with its agenda to closely replicate the informal sector, the availability of an
immediately accessible (though temporary) accommodation in the reception area was
perceived as fulfilling the urgent shelter needs of the poorest (Siddiqui 88: 7).
Though the effectiveness of the selection process thus far had been variable, the
requirement of actual use was potentially the most tangible and therefore enforceable criteria
the HDA had set. However, as the reception area needed to be a closely monitored
"observation and holding area" for prospective applicants, it relied heavily on the ability
and effectiveness of HDA site staff to impartially enforce the selection criteria. Even
though this arrangement had the inherent potential of weeding out users not in the targeted
group, its weakness lay in the unrealistic reliance on weak site supervision. Given (as
discussed earlier) that the site staff was small and underpaid, and that the reception area
required constant (24 hour) monitoring, the selection process was always under threat of
failing. Also, the fact that the reception area was freely accessible to prospective allottees
made it even more difficult for the site staff to monitor newcomers. Later, to improve
monitoring and to force serious commitment from applicants, the HDA changed the open
19It is important to note here that the average monthly rent for a single room in an informal settlement is
about Rs. 230. The rent charged for a similar accommodation in the reception area was only a little less.
2 0 The often repeated statistic (Siddiqui and Khan 1988, Van der Linden 1989, Hasan 1990) reiterates that
while all other government promoted schemes in I lyderabad and Layari (another Sindh city), have not been
occupied, almost 70% (check exact figure) in the IDS have.
access nature of the reception area by making it mandatory for applicants to make the entire
of down payment Rs. 1000 (later Rs. 1100)21 upon entering the reception area, rather than
paying when they were selected for allotment.
Despite the improvements and definition of the reception area, the reception area failed to
remain an effective filter. The prolonged "partnership" with the HDA, allowed the dalal to
gain enough recognition, credibility and clout to openly violate or easily bribe the junior
staff's regulatory function. The strikingly small number of people in Hasan's survey that
actually went through the reception area bears testimony to the failure of implementation of
an otherwise powerful idea. Of the residents surveyed in the scheme, 79% had not used
the reception area! In Sector E-3, the number of non-screened users was an overwhelming
64% (Hasan 90:56).
As the conditions in the reception area were rather primitive, many people hated
living there. Together with some of the lower HDA staff, the middleman tampered
with the period households were to stay in the reception area. If they bought one of
his (the dalals; pt) mud-brick houses, this period could be substantially shortened
or- in a few cases - skipped altogether. On the other hand, some families not
willing to buy such a house were kept in the reception area for longer than regular
periods. (Linden 89: 17)
Besides the fact that the interests of the dalals and speculators were already entrenched in
the Khuda ki Basti development process, the other major reason for the failure of the
reception area was that the HDA did not have a clear understanding of the need profile of
their targeted users. Like it did earlier, the HDA upgraded the quality of amenities in the
reception area to accommodate demands for more privacy and services made by the
prospective applicants who had already showed up at the reception area. While I discuss
the question of who these prospective beneficiaries are in the next chapter, I suggest that
this revisionist and flexible attitude of the HDA (which earlier was the strength of the
scheme), in this case might have actually hurt its intentions in two significant ways. First,
there is a tradeoff between flexibility and adaptation on the one hand and certainty and
clarity of institutional objectives and regulations of the HDA, on the other.
Second, there are limits to the empiricist approach that favors present applicants over future
2 1Rs. 1100 was between 50% and 75% of the average monthly household income in Hyderabad.
eligible entrants. The justification for the institution of a formal screening process is that it
would be impartially administered to ensure equal access to all deserving candidates
irrespective of which stage they enter the scheme. HDA's intention for changing tenure
restrictions after the first phase was that the updated requirements would be more stringent
in order to exclude undeserving applicants. In the reception area the requirements were
essentially eased, both by upgrading amenities and by uneven enforcement. This
undermined the confidence in the HDA for those who had already undergone stricter
screening, and simultaneously added credibility to the dalals efforts to subvert the HDA.
Therefore, rules that are only partially applied and are changed often, weaken and
delegitimize HDA regulations and their enforcement.
Who Benefited, Speculators or the HDA?
The various groups of speculators can be characterized either on the basis of their direct
(official) role in the IDS22, or on the basis of their peculiar motives and methods of
operation. It is also possible to differentiate speculators on the basis of their source of
wealth, power and support. However given that HDA's agenda was open to include any
relevant or active participant in the informal subdivision process, it is more fruitful to state
the general conflicting goals of the HDA and the speculators from the project.
Speculators in the IDS ranged from local leaders, social workers, informal lenders, large
feudal landlords (wadheras) to small self-made dalals. These roles were not mutually
exclusive and are often interchangeable; the overlapping and extended range of services
provided by most speculators is in fact a common characteristic of informal subdivisions
themselves. The dalal that had been engaged as a middleman by the HDA had at one time
been a squatter himself, and first organized an invasion of land in order to secure his own
claim. Having successfully utilized his connections with the police once, the dalal extended
his operations (Aliani 91: 29). The landlords too utilized their political connections to
extend their control into HDA land.
The wadheras may sell their land to subdivides in parcels of several (up to over
22Linden separates these actors on the basis of "internal" and "external" forces. I will argue that this
distinction is not useful. Since the HDA had from the very start of this project opened the possibility of
interaction with any relevant actor, this kind of characterization is circumstantial at best. Further, Linden's
own descriptions suggest that chains and networks of interests were often acting in collusion with one
another, and it would be speculative to rationalize whether one actor was more instrumental in shaping the
coalition than another.
100) acres or, alternatively, have subdivides demarcating and selling individual
plots on their behalf. Because of the legal backing of their claims and because of
the inherent power of many wadheras, the subdivides are in a strong position to
enforce their rule, if need be with the aid of armed gangs. On several occasions
HDA's staff were physically threatened by subdivides...if (the HDA staff) dared
enter the (HDA) land that he claims (Linden 89: 19).
What are the similarities and differences between the agendas of the speculators and the
HDA?
- The first obvious similarity amongst speculators was their individual profit motive.
Generally, as described above, speculators in the early stages supported the HDA in the
development as a means of gaining access into the development process. As the scheme
advanced, some speculators actually competed with each other to gain HDA's favor and
therefore a wider opportunity to profit. In other situations, as in the case of the wadheras,
speculators allied together to resist control by the HDA and simultaneously reinforce their
profit making ability. Besides using threats, the speculators co-opted local police officials
and civil servants through bribes, and more importantly by actually giving land23, as a
means of insurance against eviction24.
- The second conflicting goal was that while the HDA needed to concentrate on the
delivery of raw land, the speculators found it most advantageous to enter as many service
sectors as possible. The middleman started a private school, lent money to new allottees
for house construction and small businesses, founded a health clinic, and established a
playground. The dalal, unlike the HDA, expected to gain from provision of services.
* Thirdly, while the HDA wanted to distribute the responsibility of management and
procurement of services to beneficiary groups, speculators preferred to retain control over
information and distribution of public resources themselves. The fact that several
subdivides installed themselves as leaders in Khuda ki Basti and that a few residents of the
settlement actually gave up their previous occupations to become "members" of block
committees indicates the lucrative returns from brokering amenities.
2 3 Arif Hasan in an interview with the author.
2 4 Despite all of HDA's monitoring efforts and repeated cancellation of illegally held plots, the middleman
still managed to own over 20 plots in the sector E-4 (Linden 89: 17).
- Fourthly, while the HDA hoped to develop the project in stages, the speculators had the
most interest in ensuring that development occurred as fast as possible. The HDA
envisaged that incremental development would lower entry costs, and allow for careful
selection of allottees. The speculators who were often absentee beneficiaries themselves
obviously resisted the monitoring procedure. Besides, it was in the interest of the
speculators that improvements occurred as quickly as possible so that the values of their
investments appreciated quickly.
- Lastly, and most significantly, while the eventual goal of the HDA was to design itself out
of the process, the speculators interest was to ensure that the participation of the HDA
continued. By alternatively perpetuating opposition to the HDA (for instance with respect
to cancellation of plots), and on the other hand appealing on the users behalf for greater
amenity, the dalal hoped to reinforce his position as middleman. One method of the dalal to
enhance his credibility amongst the users at the expense of the HDA was to cast aspersions
on HDA's legitimacy both inside and outside the settlement. One dalal attempted to
discredit HDA by publicizing that HDA owed money to the Board of Revenue (which it
did), even though it was of no concern to the residents of the HDA and was not going to
impact them in any way (Linden 89).
The above section reveals the paradoxes inherent in the cooperation between state agencies
and informal subdivides. In sum, it is clear that while there are many areas where they
become natural allies (in the marketing and provision of services), it also reveals the fine
line between such cooperation and potential confrontation. It also reveals how the
speculators can use a narrow definition of HDA goals to justify their involvement in the
scheme. I speculate that if the HDA had explicitly stated an intention to replicate the
scheme elsewhere conditional upon the success of this "joint-venture", it could have
probably elicited greater "cooperation" from the speculators. I am suggesting that a longer
horizon might enhance the incentives for the HDA and the dalals to cooperate.
What did HDA Gain by the Involvement of Speculators?
This project demonstrates how the equity concerns of the state interact with the profit
motives of various actors both internal and external to the project. In fact, it illustrates the
limitations and possibilities presented when the state conceives agendas that require the
control of the market. In order to fully assess the benefits and risks of involving informal
subdivides in state promoted land delivery, I will evaluate the tasks HDA expected the
subdivides to perform. The dalals also aided the project's implementation in ways
unforeseen by the HDA.
The HDA's original reason for involving speculators (initially social workers and local
leaders, and later dalals) was to identify truly deserving beneficiaries from nearby informal
settlements. This marketing role appeared necessary in the beginning when the HDA
feared that it would not be able to attract the lowest income group. In reality, the task that
the speculators achieved was to break the development deadlock on the undesirable and
poorly accessed site, and not targeted allotment (sector D-6). Subsequently, the dalal's
marketing role cannot be viewed as either completely necessary, nor overwhelmingly
successful. As already noted, a vast majority of users had actually heard of the project by
word of mouth and through relatives in the HDA. A single newspaper advertisement
inviting prospective applicants was successful in attracting more people than the HDA
could accommodate (Hasan 90).
- A fortuitous role that the dalal played was in pre-empting invasion by other dalals. Not
only was the dalal able to monitor the site but was also able to deter takeover by
undertaking development and staking claims on the boundary of the project that was
threatened. While these actions prevented other dalals from encroaching on the settlement,
it became difficult to control the dalal himself.
* Another crucial and unexpected role that the dalal played, was the ad hoc action he took,
on HDA's behalf against other government agencies that were threatening to delay the
project. As noted earlier, the dalal even went to jail, an exercise that no government
employee would be willing to undertake
- The dalals were instrumental in extracting services from government agencies. When the
HDA was unable to procure electricity connections for Khuda ki Basti, the dalals were able
to procure permits illegally. Similarly the dalal was also able to urge for better
accommodation in the reception area, and in fact constructed some on contract.
- The very fact that the dalal needed to insert himself inextricably in the development,
implied that he needed to organize groups of beneficiaries. Despite the debatable
disadvantages of possible exploitation of the individual users by the dalal, the benefits from
organizing (for services) was a tangible benefit for the scheme.
9 The entrenched interest of the dalal ensured that he attracted individual investment in
Khuda ki Basti. Like in most of the dalals actions, this presented a tradeoff. On the one
hand, the dalal was reducing the investment HDA would have to make but on the other,
such investment was increasing the pressure of speculation on the enforcement and
screening process of the HDA.
The cheaper supply of land was clearly a threat to the market of informal subdivides. It
forced the dalals to either compete, stall, takeover, or adapt to the HDA project. While it
was too early for evidence of the impact of the project on the Hyderabad housing market,
Hasan does record that the prevailing price of Rs. 1100 was a tenth of the market price for
the plot in Khuda ki Basti.
The literature fails to recognize this extremely significant policy shift from fee-simple
property adequately. Repeatedly frustrated and undermined implementation of targeted
delivery in a market with active speculation had pushed the HDA to slowly alter not only
the distribution procedure, but in fact the nature of tenure rights that was being granted as
well. This is a fundamental lesson from the Incremental Development Scheme-- suggesting
that the successful delivery of subsidized (below market price) land is directly dependent on
the restrictions that must be imposed, both procedurally and on the land title itself, to
exclude speculative forces.
The HDA ideal, the "enablement" of the poor by the conferring of freehold title, was
gradually transformed to a delayed and conditional title, through the HDA's interaction with
dominant market forces. This consequential lowering of standards (unconditional to
restricted title) is not new. Illegal subdivision has often relied upon land undesirable to the
rest of the (formal) market. Formal state sponsored projects have precedents too. For
instance, the original concept of sites and services projects (as espoused by Turner) also
recognized the trend of lowering standards to ensure affordability and choice for the
poorest. These justifications to lower standards were optimistic at the very least.
Experiences, as epitomized by the Khuda ki Basti itself, suggest that effective targeted land
delivery is equally dependent on its ability to exclude higher bidders for the land.
3. Procedure for securing a plot
Is a More Explicit Agreement Possible?
It is difficult to put a value to services that the dalal performed. Also, there is no way to
predict what kind and amount of effort would be required of the dalal in advance. A
conventional contract may either bind the dalal to unnecessary procedures, or limit the
incentive for the dalal to do more than is agreed upon. The value of the dalal in this case
was less in the predictable jobs that the HDA had outlined earlier. In sum, besides the
extremely urgent role of initiating development, the dalals most unreplicable roles were
where he subverted inter-agency disputes on the HDA's behalf. The truly exceptional
usefulness of the dalal was in unpredictable situations where ad hoc decisions and actions
were to be performed which the HDA did not have the capability or capacity to perform. A
highly responsive contract is also a contract that has to be based on a leap of faith. There is
a tradeoff that emerges between the certainty of a signed agreement and the flexibility of an
experimental project like the IDS. Perhaps, gradually with more experience, both parties,
the state and the private subdivides would be able to better predict the nature and extent of
their relative involvement in future development projects.
However as described in this case, a contract with the dalal cannot be effective unless HDA
and the dalal are convinced that it will be enforced. The incentives and disincentives for
both parties have been briefly outlined above. To complete the evaluation of the
contributions of each party in the process, in the following chapter, I examine who the
actual beneficiaries of the project were and who actually helped them in the project.

Chapter III
OUTCOMES FROM THE USERS PERSPECTIVE
Throughout the evolution of the Incremental Development Scheme, the HDA exhibited a
clearer perception of who it wanted to exclude rather than to include. Though the HDA had
defined its target group as households of the lowest tenth percentile of income, it was
naturally unable to select beneficiaries on the basis of (a self professed) income. Hence,
the HDA used several other selection criteria, procedures, and agents as a method to sift out
candidates that did not fit its definition of eligible users. These multiple layers of selection
were not merely experiments in implementation, but actually further defined the HDA target
user group25. The procedure for selecting beneficiaries was discussed in the previous
chapter. Here I will describe who the actual beneficiaries turned out to be, on the basis of
two surveys conducted three and four years after the initiation of the project26. HDA's
development strategy, the state as a developer, had been far from successful in previous
sites and services projects promoted by it.
As discussed in the preceding chapter, many of HDA's expectations were not realized as
envisaged. It is important therefore to determine whether this long and painstaking process
was worthwhile, and if it should be pursued in the future. In the first of three sections, I
will describe the characteristics of the beneficiaries, to see if the HDA had indeed achieved
its primary goal of targeting the poorest. The second section tests the viability of the
concept of staged development by examining the results of HDA's attempts to pursue
incremental development with the participation of groups of beneficiaries organized by it.
The last section reflects on the ability of the state's ability to influence development by
25In this sense, the concept of incremental development entailed not only experimenting with procedures,
but also redefining the goals of the project. The institutional capacity of the HDA to do this was clearly
enhanced by the fact that the project was under the direct supervision of the head of the organization.
26 Van der Linden, 89: Chapter 4; Hasan, 90: Appendix 3 and 4. Both surveys interviewed 100 families
(about 4% of the Khuda ki Basti population). While Linden interviewed one family from each lane,
Hasan's survey interviewed sector wise. Thus while Linden's survey yields aggregate figures, Hasan's are
specific to each sector, and give some insight to the effect of the three stages of evolution of the selection
process.
restricting tenure security of the beneficiaries. This last section questions whether state
regulations can have any effect on a settlement process which is so heavily influenced by
illegal subdividers.
Who got What, and Why?
Conventionally, scholars expect a variation in user profiles due to the process of
consolidation inherent in new settlements on the urban periphery. When the site is remote
and unserviced, (as in the case of the IDS), its first inhabitants are expected to be those
with little choice. They relocate to the periphery, sometimes by coercion, and at other times
by the luring of agents like dalals27. Once demand for the (improved) land is created,
relatively better off households that choose to own property relocate. This scenario
corresponds to Turner's migration theory where fresh migrants to the city (bridgeheaders)
usually tend to locate (except under duress) near employment sources at the city center, and
consolidators, who have lived in the city long enough to have secured some job security,
move to cheaper land at the periphery. On the other hand, one would expect that earlier
inhabitants of remotely located and poorly serviced settlements like Khuda ki Basti would
have to be prepared to suffer bigger risks and greater inconvenience than future residents
who enter when the location is better serviced, and is therefore more desirable. Therefore,
I argue that the typical development at the periphery would attract fairly poor consolidator
families pushed out from the center of the city, and would be followed by better off middle
income users once the colony is established. How, do the beneficiary profiles of different
stages of land delivery in the Incremental Development Scheme compare in terms of
income, place of origin, and job stability with the characteristics of normally expected
users? Did the series of state interventions have any impact on the selection of beneficiaries
that actually got to live in the Khuda ki Basti? In order to answer these questions, I will
rely on Hasan's survey of 1990 which disaggregates the responses of beneficiaries by
sector28, and whose aggregate statistics generally agree with Van der Linden's poll of a
year earlier.
The aggregate figures of household income, size and age suggest that the profile of the
27As the dalals are interested in windfall profits that accrue once the site is functional and desirable, and
because immediate occupation is necessary to ensure against eviction, the dalals will often give these plots
to immediate occupiers at marginal or no cost.
2 8Recall that the IDS consists of four sectors-- D-6, E-4, E-3, and D-3, in that order of development.
Khuda ki Basti allottee matches quite closely that of the non-owner households in illegal
settlements in Hyderabad. The aggregate figures of the 1989 survey reveal that the
household income of the inhabitants of Khuda ki Basti (Rs. 1567) is 10% higher than the
median income of non-owner residents of katchi abadis29 in Hyderabad (Rs. 1450)
(Linden 89: 4 and 37). However the average household size in Khuda ki Basti is much
larger (7.24 persons per household) than that of illegal settlements in Hyderabad (5.8
persons per household). The average age of the head of household in Khuda ki Basti is
42.13 years, over three years older than that in katchi abadis in Hyderabad.
Both surveys (Hasan and Van der Linden) confirm that in aggregate, between 54 and 56
percent of the residents interviewed in Khuda ki Basti, had originally resided in
Hyderabad's illegal settlements. Almost the same number of respondents, (between 53 and
57 percent) had been renters in their previous place of residence. Thus IDS beneficiaries in
the first phase resemble well established renters in illegal settlements in Hyderabad, and
contrary to HDA expectations, only around 15% of the allottees had originated from the
nearby Kotri industrial area.
Nearly 68% of all families had lived over 10 years in their previous residence, and an
additional 15% had lived in the same location for over five years. These figures suggest
that the HDA project, involving supply of land in the periphery (which was far removed
from places of employment), was most accessible to consolidators who had resided for
long periods of time in the city and had therefore gained stable sources of employment.
Stage I, Sector D-6: Entry into Settlement
Recall that the earliest stage of development, sector D-6, had failed to target actual users
and as mentioned in the previous chapter, the sector was almost half empty by 1990. Of
respondents of the survey, a quarter had purchased their plot from original allottees, and
only 15% had actually purchased it from the dalal directly. It is probable that these
purchases were made at a market price well above the HDA rate (45% of respondents had
paid over Rs. 1100). (It is interesting that of all sectors, D-6 contained the highest number
(35%) who had already been in the market for plots before they obtained one in Khuda ki
29A "katchi abadi" directly translates to "temporary settlement", and is a euphemism for an illegal
settlement.
Basti, and in D-6 14% even had purchased a plot in another scheme as well30.) The fact
that such few respondents had purchased their plots from dalals, despite having been active
buyers, proves that the HDA assumption that local leaders and subdividers were needed in
the marketing of plots to poor users from neighboring areas was wrong.
In 1989, about two thirds of the household heads had stable employment.31; 32% of the
household heads were self employed32, and 34% were monthly wage earners. However
nearly a third of the household heads, all of whom were unskilled labor, were dependent
heavily on transportation and access to work.33
The wide spread of investment in housing underscores the financial diversity of the
beneficiaries. The top 5% spent Rs. 60,000 or more on their houses, a total of three times
the gross average annual income of a household in Khuda ki Basti. (Linden 89: 40). This
is evidence of the scheme having catered to or attracted a range of beneficiaries with
different incomes and needs. Moreover, two thirds of the respondents had purchased their
plots from the HDA directly. (In cases where the dalal was able to market plots, the
HDA's threat of cancellation at least reduced the desirability of the plot for prospective
buyers.) Thus relative to all other sectors, the users in the first stage, sector D-6, were
relatively more wealthy, and had the most secure jobs34. The most definitive indicator of
wealth, is that 20% of the beneficiaries had been able to invest more than Rs. 50,000
towards building a house in about three years!
Interestingly, a third of D-6 workers were employed in the basti itself, three quarters of
whom were self employed. Contrary to HDA's expectations, only a quarter of the D-6
workers were employed in Kotri, the nearby industrial area. Half of the D-6 residents
endured the expensive and irregular transportation to Hyderabad to get to work.
30Three quarters of the respondents from sector D-6 had previously resided in Hyderabad where almost all
had access to basic services (water, sewers, electricity and gas).
3 1Linden 89: 36. The professions of such employees were- salesmen/ hawkers (20%); white collar (7%);
skilled laborers (18%), services (8%); and other (3%). The remaining one third of household heads were
with relatively unstable sources of income (17% daily wage earners, 4% on weekly wages and 11% on
contract).
32Linden notes that such self employment is similar to many informal settlements in Hyderabad. Small
manufacturing enterprises of cigarettes, rope, paper, and carpets, bicycle repair shops, and building materials
and construction stores predominate. (Linden 89: 38).
33Interestingly, even for the 42% of household heads that were unskilled labor, about 10% had stable
employment.
3460% earned more than Rs. 1500 monthly, and the only 15% belonged to the poorest group earning less
than Rs. 1000, as compared to a cross-sector average of 30%. However as some informal sector enterprises
had been established.. the time of the survey, it is possible that a few of the richer respondents may have
been poorer when they entered the settlement.
4. Khuda-ki-Basti: Sector E-4
Thus sector D-6 (the first phase) exhibits the. - .acter of a maturing coidator settlement
at the periphery which (despite HDA's role) is not distinguishable from the expected
features of an informal settlement without state involvement. The process observed by
Turner in informal settlements was no different than that in sector D-6.
Stage II, Sector E-4: Cancellation of Allotment
The practice of cancellation of plots was effectively introduced in the second stage, in
sector E-4, to prevent delivery of plots to higher income applicants. HDA's partial success
in enforcement of its cancellation rule, is reflected by the fact that three quarters of the
residents of E-4 had received their plots from HDA directly. The middleman (dalal)
accounted for 17.5% of sales, the most in any sector35. Nevertheless, the HDA managed
to target the largest percentage of poor people in this sector: two thirds of the beneficiaries
had incomes lower than the cross-sector average of Rs. 1566, (38% of these only had a
household income less than Rs. 1000). Also, E-4 had the fewest upper income households
(with incomes greater than Rs. 3000) -- only 5% as compared to 20% in all the other
sectors. The percentage of families earning less than Rs. 1000 doubled to over one third,
when the HDA made restrictions upon both beneficiaries and speculators36(Hasan 89; 64).
It is curious that HDA's substantial success in excluding higher income families, was
accompanied by a less spectacular record of excluding middlemen from the process of land
delivery. On the other hand, the surveys testify that the middleman's clients were not
necessarily very different from the target group of the HDA. Though it obviously did not
deter the dalal, perhaps the HDA restriction on the right to transfer property was
responsible for making the Khuda ki Basti less desirable for more affluent buyers. The
profit motive of the dalal was curbed indirectly-- not just through direct enforcement by the
HDA, but more importantly by increasing the insecurity of a potential client of the dalal37.
35A nearly corresponding 22.5% of respondents had paid over Rs. 1100 (the maximum down payment
levied by the HDA).
36From the standpoint of physical indicators, it is interesting that the densities per plot also increased
significantly when HDA imposed tenure and use restrictions on the beneficiaries, from 5.7 persons per plot
in D-6, progressively to 7.73 in D-3 (Hasan 90: 53).
37The fact that the dalal also supplied housing to the HDA target group (when he technically could do so to
higher income groups), serves to moderate Van der Linden's argument that the HDA must inherently remain
in conflict with speculators. As seen here in Sector E4, the HDA can partially co-opt the dalals
speculative initiatives.
It is of importance to note that the cancellation of plots does not pose a serious
problem to the common inhabitants... (Cancellation; pt) is typically a problem of
leaders, absentee owners and owners of many plots (often these roles are
combined). (Linden 89: 44)
The results of screening potential users through the reception area have to be viewed in
light of the fact that the cancellation of plots was becoming institutionally more difficult for
the HDA, as the project grew38. As discussed in the last chapter, the reception area was
unsuccessful because only 21% of all beneficiaries actually went through it (Hasan 90: 35).
The implication here would be that the rest of the beneficiaries had evaded the selection
procedure and obtained plots through dalals or other speculators.
Stage III, Sectors E-3 and D-3: Screening through Reception Area
Surprisingly, the percentage of plots bought directly from the HDA continued to rise in
each subsequent sector. The percentage of applicants who actually went through the
reception area, almost doubled to 36% in sector E-3 and to 40% in sector D-3. In the last
sector, D-3, all the plots had been purchased directly from the HDA, while in E-3, (the
sector developed just prior to that), 88% of respondents had done so too. Corresponding
closely, the percentage of households earning less than Rs. 1000 in each of those sectors
was 28% and 33%. In terms of money spent on house construction, nearly half of the
residents spent only between Rs. 5000 and Rs. 10000, as against an overall average of
11% in Khuda ki basti. This relatively low investment rate and the fact that over half of the
respondents in sectors E-3 and D-3 were laborers, further suggests that entry for
economically vulnerable applicants was still possible in the last stage of the project, even
when it was maturing into a settlement desirable to more mobile and prosperous
households39. On the other hand, the percentage of rich households earning more than
Rs. 3000, in both sector E-3 and D-3, was the same as in D-6. Thus while the value of the
reception area is evident, the difficulty with enforcing and monitoring its use, is illustrated
by the fact that richer users also received plots (without going through the reception area).
3 8 0ne of the reasons for the success of the scheme in its early stages was that the small and dedicated staff
was committed to ensure first, that it remained in constant touch with residents, and second, that the HDA
regulations were enforced. When the project expanded, the site staff became far less connected to the
residents of the Basti and became more bureaucratic. I lasan 90: 30.
39Hasan 90: Appendix 3/4.
In sum, a majority of the beneficiaries of the Incremental Development Scheme were
consolidators with large families who were willing and able to make the move to the
periphery, where access to land was possible. The official cost of entry (Rs. 1000 down
payment and a monthly deposit from Rs. 50 to Rs. 100), was affordable for most
beneficiaries, especially as the average monthly rent they had to pay in a katchi abadi in
Hyderabad was Rs. 298 (Linden 89: 33). When the HDA had awarded full fee-simple title
without any restrictions, 40% of the plots had been resold to present users at a rate higher
than the subsidized one. As HDA's restrictions increased there was a notable decline in
resales. In E-4, (where mandatory occupancy was required along with an accompanying
HDA restriction to transfer land), re-sales declined to one quarter40 of all sales. In the final
two sectors, E-3 and D-3, (where the reception area was operational), 12% and 0% re-
sales, respectively, were recorded.
The unique achievements of the Incremental Development Scheme are two-fold. First, as
compared to informal settlements in Hyderabad, the project consistently targeted more low
income families (Aliani 91: 32). HDA restrictions for beneficiaries effectively reduced the
number of speculative re-sales. Secondly, and perhaps most unusually, the IDS managed
to sustain the opportunity for new entrants of the lowest income, even when it matured.
Organizing Beneficiaries Around the Provision of Amenities
The HDA hoped that in order to manage local infrastructure provision, it would be able to
delegate authority to working groups consisting of representatives of beneficiaries4l. This
reasoning came out of the experience that HDA ran unduly high overhead costs in direct
provision of infrastructure, which could be saved if the beneficiaries managed it themselves
with the assistance of the HDA. Further, the HDA expected that if decision-making about
prioritizing and sequencing of services and other needs were left to a participatory
organization, the development would be more responsive and efficient. For the
4(}Though the trend was favorable in itself, recall that the dalals at this stage, (including the middleman) had
attempted to re-enact the first phase by putting up fake applicants and even by direct invasion of land. It is
also crucial to recall that the HDA had knowingly paid the dalal for his services, with plots (Arif Hasan, in
an interview with the author). Therefore, on the one hand, Linden's record of the middleman owning twenty
plots does not necessarily reflect poorly on the HDA enforcement ability, and on the other, the probability
that these plots were resold must be considered in the overall sales figure.
4 1The concept of provision of infrastructure to users organized at the lane level originated in the Orange
Pilot Project in Karachi. Though attempted briefly in the IDS, the idea did not work because the users were
not acquainted with each other, as they had been in Karachi (Hasan 90: 17).
incremental, self-help provision of amenities to succeed, responsive self-management of
the community was necessary. The latter however was hard to achieve.
In order to effectively organize infrastructure and welfare programs, the HDA appointed a
working committee of motivated residents. The empowerment of volunteers failed because
of its non-representative nature and the clash of interests between priorities of each sector.
As an alternative, the HDA held elections for leadership of block organizations. A vote
was subsequently conducted by a show of hands. By and large, those elected were
middlemen, land grabbers, small time entrepreneurs and their musclemen (Hasan 90: 27).
A majority of respondents of a survey in 1990, felt that block organizations did not
represent their interests (Hasan 90: 73). The result was not merely because of a non-
anonymous voting method but as already noted earlier, dalals and speculators had incentive
to involve themselves inextricably in the affairs of the basti.
The universally felt infrastructure need of the beneficiaries was piped water. The lack of
water was such a grave threat to the beneficiaries' use of their plot, that they demanded the
HDA to provide piped water along with allotment, and agreed to a 30% increase of the
downpayment, to pay for it (Hasan 90: 14). I will argue later that the absence of water
would have made the occupation of the plot extremely difficult. More than any tenure
restriction, water (or lack of it) had the potential of eliminating any tenure security that the
possession of a plot might bring.
All other amenities were differently required by users, and therefore resulted in varying
incentives to cooperate. In general, three categories of infrastructure provoked different
responses. The first category of infrastructure like electricity, gas, and sewerage that
needed large networks, was mostly demanded of and provided by the HDA. The lowest
priority for users was the sewerage, which therefore was the most lacking. The second
category of amenities, relating to building and credit was predominantly delivered on a case
by case basis by dalals.
The alliances of interest in incremental infrastructure provision which involves external
agencies, are unique because the interested parties include all three major interest groups,
the users, dalals and the HDA. This is illustrated by the experience of obtaining electricity
connections from an uncooperative government agency (from which the HDA could not
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5. Sector E-4: Limited organization of users
around infrastructure provison
obtain electricty connections). Besides pressurizing the HDA, the users of sector D-6
entered an external agreement with local officials of the electricity board to obtain
connections in their sector. The dalals directly bribed officials too and obtained the
requisite no-objection certificates, which they sold in the settlement. Here the
responsibility of providing electricity, however uncomprehensive and uncoordinated, was
shared by the beneficiaries and the dalals.
The third category, the provision of community services like health clinics, schools,
transportation, and informal employment, were mostly shared between individual
entrepreneurs and dalals, with a small complement from NGO's invited by the HDA. The
director of the HDA used his considerable influence to get government departments,
transportation agencies, police, banks, charitable health services, and NGO's involved with
job training and educational services. Hasan records that all of these services either failed
or were withdrawn once the leadership of the HDA changed. I speculate that such non-
profit services were vulnerable to entrenched entrepreneurial interests. Without the
institutional support and legitimacy of the HDA, such autonomous NGO's could not work
effectively42. More importantly, the resistance of NGO's sheds light on an internal barrier
to cooperation within the community. Individual entrepreneurs and dalals resist
organizations that substitute their earning potential.
Recall that the original HDA justification to award fee-simple tenure to target beneficiaries
had been precisely this-- to empower users to make their own choices, and by extension, to
facilitate user participation and management of improvement programs. Did the
implementation expediency of the HDA (that imposed successive restrictions on the users
and their rights on the plot they received), undermine the beneficiaries to the advantage of
middlemen?
First it is necessary to examine if there is any relationship between how beneficiaries felt
about their block organizations, and the terms and procedures by which they received their
plots. The survey43 responses from different sectors are extremely varied and there is little
correlation between the selection process used and the degree of participation in block
organizations. On average, only about one third of the respondents in each sector
42The limitations of delegating the developmental role of the state to Non-Governmental Organizations are
discussed in detail by Tendler (1982). The report questions the assumption that the NGO's are more
innovative, responsive, and effective in local development work. Her central argument rests on the
observation that though well intentioned, the NGO is limited by its ability to force uncooperative actors to
participate by its agenda.
43Hasan 90: 52-83; Appendix 3/4
participated in block committee activities, irrespective of the procedure by which they were
allotted a plot. There is however a noticeable increase in the percentage of people
preferring to deal with the HDA directly, as the scheme progressed. While about two
thirds of respondents in the earlier two sectors wanted to deal with the HDA, four fifths of
users from the later developed sectors (E-3 and D-3) wanted to do so. This also
corresponds to the increased number of users that purchased their plots directly from the
HDA (rather than from dalals or original owners). Thus while the selection process did not
necessarily ensure their participation, the greater engagement of the HDA in monitoring the
process of land delivery and infrastructure development, was endorsed by 72% of the
respondents who wanted to continue dealing with the HDA.
The size of a community group, and familiarity of the community had a direct bearing on its
ability to gain consensus. HDA had created blocks of sizes ranging between 100 to 250
households, the optimum neighborhood size for minimizing infrastructure costs
(specifically, sewerage and water lines).44. The block organization was to be responsible
for the collection of development charges and for the identification, budgeting, supervision,
and payment of infrastructure development. With large development units however, not
only was it difficult for the users to agree with each other, but there was also a conflict of
interest built into staging and prioritizing delivery. A large group for instance would have a
wide range of beneficiaries with different willingness and ability to pay for infrastructure in
a coordinated manner. Even when collection difficulties were overcome, there was a
problem with project horizons and delivery. From the point of view of the HDA for
instance, infrastructure installation for a sector could be viewed as a single job, but for the
individual users, the expectation was that their money yield immediate and tangible results.
The trunk supply line cost much money, and money from the second block was
used to pay for part of this line which caters to both blocks, with the difference that
one block has got the connections while the other has not45. (Linden 89: 46)
Despite the above difficulties, sector E-4 was more successful than others in forming
community coalitions because nearly all residents surveyed had first heard of the Khuda ki
Basti from friends, and nearly two thirds actually had relatives living in the settlement46.
44The conflict between the tangible gains from engineering efficiency and unsure expected gains from
community cohesion was a major issue amongst project planners. Arif Hasan in an interview.
45Though the above mentioned case was attributed to initial "teething troubles", it is representative of the
problem of justifying expenditure beyond the immediate neighborhood of the contributor.46Hasan 90: 56. Van der Linden's survey also points out that families were often very large, and 38% of
the users actually occupied two plots, and 2% even occupied three plots. Most families were two or three
Here the HDA lost an opportunity to organize people in smaller groups because its
allotment process which was based upon the random drawing of lots,47 precluded the
formation of self chosen groups based on familiarity (on regional, familial, or ethnic lines).
In sum, the HDA goal of community participation was contingent on representative local
leadership, appropriately sized neighborhood units, and familiarity and trust amongst their
members.
Akin to land subdividing, the political representation and leadership of such settlements is a
full time (and paying) job. What is more, the profession of leadership, is viewed by
residents with mistrust.
There was strong pressure (to become a member of a block committee; pt) on one
young man whom most of the inhabitants of a block thought to be honest and to
have certain organizational qualities. He refused, saying that he wanted to be
known as a decent person and not spoil his name by being a member. (Linden 89:
26)
Such comments are evidence of a dual structural problem. Not only are they indications of
patronage and manipulation by speculators, but also signs of the unavailability of willing
and able representatives amongst the residents of Khuda ki basti. Thus HDA's mission of
incremental amenity provision was primarily dependent on legitimate and capable
representation of residents.
Clearly, the ideal preconditions for incremental development were not common in Khuda ki
Basti, and needed to be created over time. The incentives and disincentives for the users to
organize varied with the interaction of different actors -- the HDA, dalals, private
entrepreneurs, fledgling block organizations, and Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGO's). The instances when users cooperate (or not) are discussed below.
- On occasions, the users organized themselves at the level required to deal with commonly
felt needs. In D-6 for instance, when the residents were unable to pay bribes demanded by
the local functionaries of the electricity board, they volunteered to dig holes for electricity
poles, so that the money thus saved could be pocketed by the officials (Aliani and Yap 89:
11).
generation nuclear families. Often the eldest son and his wife would occupy a seperate plot. There are also
a few dalals who were given plots by the HDA in return for their role as middlemen.
47Badshah 91: 235.
* As the case of the supply line in sector E-4 (described above) also suggests, under
conditions of scarcity, users (sometimes groups of users) have more incentive to compete
rather than cooperate. Moreover, the HDA was forced to make unequal provisions to
compensate for cost over-runs or in situations where mismanagement occured. While the
dalal in such a situation would pass the losses to the users, the HDA had to internalize
them. Despite this, the HDA was liable to be held up for "preferential" treatment by other
sectors who had not received more compensation.
- The residents of D-6 were first instigated to organize when they felt that the HDA was
going to withdraw from the sector, because it had not been able to target the poorest. They
effectively organized to collect the required installment payments, and forced the HDA to
fulfill its obligation for infrastructure.
- Users also tended to collectively voice their complaints to the HDA, in an attempt to
persuade the government to provide better services. Even when three quarters of residents
had received water connections from the HDA, they continued to complain about the lack
of other services. Linden records several situations where residents were unwilling to
contribute towards sewers and gas connections. This was because they expected the HDA
to provide these services free of charge, as was the practice in other settlements that were
regularized.
- A large majority of the users were vocal about their mistrust of dalals (Linden 89: 47).
Though many of their complaints about extortion and short-dealings by dalals were valid,
this loud rejection of dalals also reflects the coercive power of the dalals, and their ability to
make the users pay (at premium) for the services provided. Once again, it is interesting that
the users were not reserved in sometimes admonishing the HDA, and as easily appealing to
it for help and arbitration.
In summary, three assumptions about conditions for cooperation amongst beneficiaries are
disproved.
First, harmonious community participation cannot be assumed just because most residents
have similar needs. Residents will compete with each other for scarce resources when for
instance, infrastructure phasing is decided by the development authority. Also, in the case
where block committee members were elected with a small majority, the defeated group
would attempt to discredit the members by derailing development efforts (Hasan 90: 27).
Second, the assumption that community groups are empowering to users, is not always
true. Large, identifiable community groups can be a threat to local power hierarchies. For
instance, the muhajirs48, an ethnic minority in Sindh, but a vast majority (78%) of
beneficiaries, fled the site when civil disturbances occurred in the area. They were
threatened by the surrounding landlords who played on ethnic differences, to take over the
project.49
Third, eventhough the HDA had created equal groups, of the same size and authority, it
was unable to treat them equally because of incidental implementation problems. The E-4
case where the HDA itself was experimenting for the first time, required the HDA to take
remedial action that favored one sector. Such incidents were immediately used to leverage
favors by other groups, or at least to discredit the HDA.
Managing Tenure Security
As has been discussed earlier, speculators were partially filtered (by the HDA) by the
delaying of the awarding of title, the (threat of) cancellation of allotments, and the
requirement of use of the reception area. These filters were effective to varying degrees in
restricting dalals and high income speculators. In this section I will argue that the sustained
enforcement of these screening mechanisms is dependent upon the process of incremental
infrastructure development itself.
Let me first recount briefly the barriers HDA constructed for dalals and higher income
households, and examine how they affected the targeted user. From the perspective of a
prospective allottee, the complete procedure to obtain a plot would be as follows. First the
applicant, on hearing of the scheme, would take off a day of work to go to the site and
verify the feasibility of a move50. The applicant would then have to arrange the down
payment required by the HDA, a sum equal to the average monthly wage5 1. This down
payment was the first filter of applicants, though it eliminated the poorest families rather
than those richer than the target group. When the concept of a down payment was first
48The Muhajirs are refugees/ descendants from India or Bangladesh.
49Arif Hasan, in an interview with the author.
50Hasan records that this was a common pattern; before making a big commitment, it was reasonable for
one family member to scout the conditions of the basti.
51 In the final stage, the downpayment had increased to Rs. 1100.
operationalized (the amount was Rs. 460), the HDA rationale was to cover the cost of raw
land, and HDA overheads. The amount was then raised to Rs. 910, because the HDA felt
that some of the persons paying Rs. 460 could not afford the subsequent monthly
installment of Rs. 50 (required to pay for future infrastructure provision). This therefore
amounted to a conscious decision to establish a floor price based upon the allottees' likely
ability to pay the subsequent instalments. The down payment amounts to a deliberate (if
reasoned) filtering out of many families in the lowest tenth percentile of income, the
professed target group, who did not have access to (formal or informal) credit or have the
requisite savings. As a result, this filter favored consolidators rather than bridgeheaders.
HDA's partial success in enforcing the use of the reception area, can be explained in a
similar way. For a combination of reasons, a family had the choice of circumventing the
HDA requirement of staying in the reception area. As recounted before, the middleman
could offer some entrants shortened stays at the reception area (by bribing monitoring staff)
if the applicants purchased a plot with a house constructed by him. However the failure of
the reception area is as much caused by higher income users as the dalal. The HDA had
already been persuaded by earlier applicants that a reception area without shelter and
adequate amenities was unacceptable because it did not allow privacy to the families of new
applicants. The HDA was therefore also persuaded to raise standards of the reception area.
As recounted earlier, the HDA had contracted a dalal to construct shelters in the reception
area, which were rented out to desirous applicants at just below the market rate. Improving
living conditions in the reception area defeated the original purpose of the HDA-- to test
true need for shelter. There is no documentation that explains how it was possible that in
the last sector (D-3), all of the beneficiaries received plots directly from the HDA but only
40% used the reception area. I speculate that the already increased standards in the
reception area laid a precedence for delivering plots to actual users directly. However, even
in the last phase, the reception area was not entirely useless. As indicated earlier, poorer
bridgeheader families from outside Hyderabad could gain immediate access to the reception
area at minimal cost. In these cases, by being openly accessible, the reception area enabled
new migrants to apply for a plot directly without an up front financial committment.
The reception area therefore was less effective as a mechanism of exclusion of richer
applicants, than it was a mechanism to include poorer users that required immediate access
to shelter as well. (In this respect, the reception area was similar to an informal settlement
that allows immediate access to users, but at a cheaper rent and with some expectation of
being awarded a plot.) Since there is no record of how many applicants were rejected at the
reception area, it is difficult to estimate the uncertainty of those who did use the reception
area. The most that an applicant could actually lose, would be two weeks rent, and the
transaction costs of relocation. When the scheme matured, the overflowing demand caused
the HDA to impose a further restriction on entry to the reception area. An applicant was
then required to make the full downpayment before entering the reception area, andeven
before the selection process began.
Once applicants were selected, HDA issued an allotment paper (not the title deed) to
applicants. Receiving the title deed was conditional on the building of a house and
inhabiting it in a prescribed period of time. Legally, the HDA retained the right to evict
those that did not pay the monthly installments either. Thus from the perspective of the
HDA, the occupation of a plot became a privilege accorded to deserving applicants, which
in legal terms resembles a medium-term52 lease (with the added expectation of legal title at
the end of the term.) The property was liable to revert back to the HDA unless the applicant
fulfilled certain specified conditions. In order to limit speculation on plots, the HDA added
a further restriction on the title-- resale was not permitted- and re allotment was to be done
by the HDA exclusively. Because of HDA's inability to keep track of resales, it revised
this restriction, so that the new owner, and not the seller (the original allottee) was liable to
pay a transfer fee.53 To improve the chances of its collection, the block organizations were
given the charge to collect and use the money on neighborhood projects.
Thus while the incentive to enforce transfer fees was with a block organization, the
incentive to evade its payment was only with people with multiple plots for sale (because
the fee would effectively lower the price the plot could be sold for.) Given that block
organizations had been taken over by dalals and other speculators, the incentive to enforce
transfer fees payments was poorly placed. Here too, it is relevant to reiterate that the legal
requirement set by the HDA was only effective when offenders perceived that it would be
enforced.
Tenure restrictions did not always restrict development itself. As in informal settlements,
the threat of cancellation of allotment was mitigated by dalals, by the building of fairly
permanent structures on the plots. Recall that the dalal paid a person to keep up the
pretense that the plots were occupied (when actually they were not). This reveals the
uncertainty of the dalal about whether building a structure was sufficient to prevent
52The repayment schedule required applicants to complete payments over approximately an eight year
period, though they could do so faster if they wished.
53The fee amounted to Rs. 2000, about a fifth of the total HDA price.
cancellation. This also proves the usefulness of delaying the awarding of title. The HDA
was most effective (and determined) to cancel plots in the second sector, when its
relationship with the dalal was still uncertain, and the memory of its failure to target
effectively in the first sector (D-6)was still fresh. Note that each (legal) restriction imposed
by the HDA, created a parallel responsibility for the HDA to enforce it. The more severe
the penalty, the harder it is to enforce it.
A beneficiary that fulfilled all HDA requirements did not have to worry at all about the
possibility of cancellation and the restrictions on resale put by the HDA were mostly
irrelevant too. These legal tenure restrictions by the HDA did not affect most users, only
speculators. The responsibility of enforcing eligibility rested solely with the HDA, until the
time that it also started impacting the users. Recall that after the riots in Hyderabad, when
many of the houses were left uninhabited, the remaining users petitioned the HDA to
reallocate unused plots. This was because they felt unsafe in the desolate neighborhood.
The job of the HDA to identify unused lots was taken over by actual users, once it impacted
them too.
Similarly, the restrictions on the reception area, were felt by applicants (who found the
temporary shelter inconvenient) and dalals (whose potential clients were being screened out
by the HDA). Though it is not clear whether the HDA submitted to pressure, or
unilaterally eliminated the requirement, clearly the responsibility to enforce the reception
area would not have been shared by either the beneficiaries or the dalals. (The new entrants
who needed the reception area would not have representation before they arrived.)
In sum, legal security of tenure, the threat of eviction, is distinct from tenure security of
different actors, unless it directly impacts them and is enforced. (No legal contract can be
binding unless the offenders are convinced that they will be prosecuted.) Even though the
HDA by default attempted to retain its control by prolonging the insecurity of the allottees,
the control over the beneficiaries and dalals, decreased drastically once the users were
reasonably sure they could not be evicted. (The HDA enforcement ability effectively
reduced as the project progressed.)
This chapter first revealed the income, job stability, and traced the place of origin of the
IDS beneficiaries. It is clear that the state agency was largely unable to anticipate its target
group not only because of procedural constraints, but also because it did not have a clear
conception of who it was selecting and who was being screened out. The dalals had a
clearer picture of their prospective market only because they were able to deal on an
individual basis. This section also confirmed that the task of beneficiary selection is even
more complicated because of the evolution of a settlement itself, and the fact that even to
begin with, low income settlements are not homogeneous. The second section examined
the barriers to gradual incremental development based on community group cooperation.
Clearly , the IDS experience demonstrates that community organization is not a panacea for
consensus amongst diverse interests and needs of the users. Also, scarcity of resouces and
entrenched interests are constant internal barriers to such organizing. Thirdly, the creative
instruments used by the HDA to select beneficiaries were only partially successful. The
HDA used a two pronged strategy. On the one hand, it attempted to create favorable
situations ensuring greater access for the poorest, and on the other it set up several filters to
discourage dalals and higher income users. While the HDA was distinctly successful with
the former approach, its record with the latter was less so. For instance, during land
delivery, the reception area was less effective as a mechanism to include poorer users.
Meanwhile, HDA's tenure restrictions, aimed as disincentive for dalals, were only effective
when the HDA was able to enforce them. The more stringent the HDA attempted to get
with the dalal, the greater was the strain on its enforcement capability. The IDS suggests
that the interaction of the state with the market and a wide profile of users must yield
messy, and not completely predictable or rationalizable results. The concluding chapter that
follows, explores what the conditions for replicability of such a development approach
might be.

Chapter IV
REDEFINING OBJECTIVES
In the messy and confusing situations of real projects, analysts and officials can
usually only identify prerequisites after they have implemented the project, if at all
(Hirschman 1958).
In the opening chapter I described the theoretical precedence and perceptions of the strained
development scenario in Hyderabad, that defined HDA's central objective as the awarding
of freehold title and security of tenure to enable the poorest. In the second chapter, I
described how the HDA struggle to keep control over the development process and the
expediency of implementation, effectively transformed this objective into the restriction of
rights of beneficiaries. I argued that the conditions and requirements of the earlier phases
were different from the later ones when the settlement had matured. Also, the willingness
of the HDA to work with dalals diminished as its ability to hold them accountable
decreased. On the other hand, the dalals aided in removing unforeseen barriers that might
have stalled the project. In the third chapter, I examined who the beneficiaries of the
project were. I showed that HDA's flexibility in accommodating the dalal compromised its
objective of targeting the poorest beneficiaries. Also, despite conventional expectations,
the awarding of conditional title directly to beneficiaries did not completely prevent the
coercion and patronage by the dalals and local leaders. Additionally, HDA's anticipation of
participation between beneficiaries did not occur because the size of organizations and the
scale of efficient infrastructure provision did not coincide. On the other hand, it was not
the HDA awarded legal title, but the dalal brokered provision of infrastructure that
enhanced tenure security of beneficiaries.
In the earlier chapters therefore, I have shown how the agendas of the development were
transformed. In this chapter, I will assess the achievements of the Incremental
Development Scheme, and recast HDA's agenda according to what was realistically
achieved. In the first of three sections in this chapter, I will first briefly describe the unique
achievements of the Incremental Development Scheme, in comparison to exclusively state
promoted sites and services projects and dalal developed informal settlements in
Hyderabad. In the second section of this chapter, I will reframe a set of realistic criteria for
evaluating success based upon these achievements. In the third section, I will restate the
options and limitations for the state in pursuing joint development. I will speculate upon
possible alternate actions the state may resort to. In the final section, I will speculate upon
the implications of the goals and institutional limitations of incremental schemes like the
IDS, on their effective physical layout. This exploratory section will attempt to set a
framework within which development goals of the state can be enhanced.
Unique Achievements of Joint Development by Market & State
While it is not possible to comprehensively assess the costs and benefits of the scheme, and
despite the numerous shortfalls alluded to previously, there are some features in its
outcome that stand out as different from what has previously been achieved alone by either
the market or the state. These achievements are significant not only as justifications of the
Incremental Development Scheme, but also have bearing on future policy.
First, I was surprised to see that even though not all the beneficiaries of the Incremental
Development Scheme belonged to the target income group, most of the allotted plots were
developed and actually used. This is an unusual outcome in the context of Hyderabad,
where speculation was so high that only 35 of about 15000 plots sold by the HDA in eight
years had actually been built upon5 4 . This outcome of the project is inspite of the situation
of scarcity of land and growing demand that ensure a perpetual sellers market.
Second, researchers agree that though settlements at the periphery begin with
consolidators, (usually poor families with relatively secure jobs), as the settlement matures,
it becomes more desirable for the higher income groups. In the Incremental Development
Scheme, it is unusual that nearly 40% of the low income beneficiaries received land, many
of them in the later stages of the scheme. Thus although less than a majority of users were
poor, the fact that poor beneficiaries continued to get access to the scheme is remarkable. It
is particularly pertinent that these target users that belonged to the lowest tenth percentile of
income, had not found entry as owners in either the conventional schemes of the HDA or in
illegal settlements.
54 Siddiqui 88: 5
Third, it is not insignificant that the Incremental Development Scheme was successful in
leading the development in the urban fringe. Part of a state planned 1200 acre mixed-use
development, the IDS was distantly located with poor access and no infrastructure. Other
development initiatives by the HDA in the area had failed. Even the nearest illegal
settlement (before the IDS was initiated) was over 6 kilometers away in the Kotri industrial
area. Hence, without the combined assurances and efforts of both the state and the dalals,
low income development would have been impossible at the time. An added indication of
the catalytic role of the intervention is the fact that by 1990, another illegal settlement,
Shaheen Nagar, had come up next to Khuda ki basti (Hasan 90: 39).
In summary, the most salient characteristic of the IDS was that it was successful in
encouraging new owner-occupiers over owner-non occupiers. This was a combined result
of many of HDA's creative implementation strategies, the most important being the
substitution of legal title for users with conditional possession of a plot. This is a crucial
policy lesson because though conventionally one would expect that release of land would
encourage ownership, in a scenario of extreme scarcity (where large economic incentives to
speculate on land exist), the state might need to distinguish between ownership for use and
ownership for speculation for two reasons. First, if as in the IDS, the concern of the state
is equity, hoarding of land can further exacerbate not only land values but also the
patronage network for gaining access to land. In the Hyderabad case, local feudal
landlords (wadheras), were responsible for several efforts to subvert the scheme. Second,
if as in Hyderabad, speculation does not result in the creation of more housing stock, the
ability of the HDA to efficiently direct development and plan infrastructure with limited
resources would diminish. In terms of the IDS, the incremental provision of infrastructure
would be hampered if a large number of users did not participate.
Reassessment of Criteria for Success
The framing of the original criteria for success itself reflected the tradeoffs between equity
and efficiency reasoned by the implementing authority. As the IDS experience clearly
indicates, the partnership of the state and market agents will result not only in a varied
implementation, but also in the recasting of the agenda based upon the persistent objectives
of each actor. In this section I compare the outcomes of the project with the original
objectives, and question whether diversions from earlier goals are shortcomings or not.
1. Sector D-6 2. Private transport to Hyderbad
3. One day old shelter 4. Improvised shelter
5. Permanent shelter 6. Local tea-stall
6. Incremental Development in Khuda-ki-Basti
This exercise also reveals the areas of difference and agreement between the HDA and
dalals.
- Targeting / Access to the poorest: The expectation of exclusively targeting a
homogeneous income group proved to be unrealistic in the IDS. There are two reasons
why this is so. First in terms of need, it is conventionally recognized that even in squatter
settlements, the users do not necessarily belong to a single income group (Burgess 87,
Payne 84). In the IDS, this spread of income could occur because of infiltration of the
demands of the next higher income groups (say, consolidators), as much as because of the
attraction of informal (self managed) enterprises, or the filtering up of beneficiaries that
once belonged to the target income group. 5 5  Second, from the standpoint of
implementability, the HDA agenda of targeting the poorest was in conflict with the profit
motives of the dalal. As mentioned earlier, the HDA was more successful in ensuring
access to the poorest (by keeping the option of open access to a reception area), than it was
in excluding relatively higher income groups (who were able to avoid initial screening
procedures).
F Security of Tenure: Of all the original assumptions of the HDA, its notions of legal and
operational tenure underwent the most significant transformation. This is not surprising
because by definition, tenure describes the agreements between parties about their relative
rights and duties towards a certain resource (Bromley 90). Therefore, the change of tenure
is a redistributive process that inherently implies conflicts of interest (Farvacque et al 92).
The HDA assumption of the importance of full legal title matched the conventional
understanding, that freehold tenure5 6 was a precondition for individual investment and that
it empowered beneficiaries by decreasing their dependence on, and vulnerability to local
patronage networks. In sum, these assumptions implied that freehold tenure was a
necessary and sufficient condition for targeted incremental development. In the IDS
experience, neither assumption was necessarily true. Indeed, for instance, it was to
counter the threat of eviction that the dalals developed their properties. On the other hand,
having fulfilled the precondition of habitation, the users were less liable to be evicted, and
were therefore less obligated to fulfill other HDA conditions. Legal title, is therefore not
5 5 Several dalals, contractors, small tradesmen and entrepreneurs in the IDS originally belonged to the target
group but moved up income-wise (Hasan 90, Aliani 91).
5 6 Freehold tenure is defined as the absolute ownership of land. No land-right owner is superior to the
freeholder. The freeholders rights extend for an indefinite duration, are inheritable, and are only bound by
laws of the land (Farvacque et al. 92: 46).
the only determinant of tenure security; location specific factors such as access to essential
infrastructure 5 7 , and proximity to jobs affect beneficiary security too.
In order to discourage speculators, the HDA resorted to the delayed awarding of title, and
imposed restrictions on transfer of title. The results of these legal conditions were
dependent upon their enforcement, which was facilitated by the fact that allottees had to
physically demonstrate their possession and use of the plot. Certainly, when enforced,
these restrictions were successful in weeding out non-occupier speculators. This perhaps
is the feature that most distinguishes the projects outcome. When enforced by the state,
delayed tenure conditional on the use of a plot resulted in the control of outright speculation
on the basis of use and not household income.
- Affordability: HDA's interpretation of affordability was to phase entry costs in a manner
that the target group could pay for the land and services. The down payment in its
financing plan was based upon a concurrent estimation of the ability of a family to pay
incrementally for the infrastructure. This criterion was not tested. Contrary to
conventional understanding, even the poorest beneficiaries were able to raise money to
meet down payments, the mandatory installments for infrastructure, and investment in
improvements, without reliance on formal credit 5 8 . On the other hand, the delayed
payment plan increased the dalal's profit margin as the demand (therefore premium) for the
plots was independent of the HDA set price.
Options for the State
This thesis sheds light on the opportunities and pitfalls of partnerships between the state
and illegal subdividers in the development of land. My main contention is that the outcome
of such a process is determined more by a series of circumstances rather than by the
strategies of well meaning people. In the preceding chapters I described how the sequence
of events effectively redefined the objectives of the project. I showed that not only did the
incentives and terms of cooperation between dalals and the state change as the scheme
progressed, but also that the state was unable to hold the dalal accountable (as in a formal
contract).
57 Hasan notes that beneficiaries unanimously agreed to pay the HDA for piped water, without which their
occupation of an allotted plot would be difficult.
58Linden 89: 16.
The effective transformation of criteria for success reiterates the fact that the agenda of the
state will necessarily be modified by the interaction with market agendas, in a scheme like
the IDS. A partnership with dalals requires the state to be prepared to be flexible about its
plans, targets, and implementation methods.
Dalals have their own agenda dominated by their profit motive, which may clash with that
of the state. The dalal has the ability to deal opportunistically on a case by case basis, while
the state is restricted to imposed decisions from the top and is influenced from below.
Further, as the development agency can be influenced by political pressure applied by
dalals (the state is clearly not a monolithic, consistent entity), it is vulnerable when it takes
strong action. This is illustrated by the following incident that occurred as a result of the
IDS:
Tasneem Siddiqui, the Director General of HDA, the initiator and the driving force
of the project, was eased out of office because he was inconvenient to powerful
local interests and co-opted functionaries in the government. He is presently on a
five year leave of absence from the civil service, and is currently setting up a Non-
Governmental Organization (with Arif Hasan), Sahibaan, that hopes to work on
similar housing issues 59 .
Third, despite the obvious barriers to cooperation, the state cannot avoid the presence of the
illegal market. The best that the state can do is to improve the bargaining position and
leverage of beneficiaries and public agencies.
In the Khuda ki basti itself, several beneficiaries complained about the self-serving
and oppressive dalal. On the one hand, the dalal backed out of obligations towards
improvements in the basti. On the other hand, the coercion by the dalal evoked
strong disapproval, and a consequent affirmation of faith in the HDA. "We do not
need leaders; let HDA do the work directly with us; when they work through the
members, it causes losses to us." (Linden 89: 47)
Perhaps one indication for a future strategy is the fact that the IDS opened choices to
beneficiaries that they had not received earlier. The partial success at mobilizing beneficiary
demand, at the cost of inefficient and "messy" results, suggests that the state cannot and
59Arif Hasan, in an interview with the author.
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perhaps should not expect to restrict its targeting to beneficiaries to a particular sub-market,
or its development strategy to only state directed development. Direct subsidies to the
poorest in the form of vouchers, development credit, increased access to information, and
the organization of beneficiary groups would all empower users in bidding for market or
state produced options. Instead of viewing them as a failure, the mixed results of the
Incremental Development Scheme can therefore be seen as a success in opening new
choices. Certainly an incremental development scheme is useful for the channels it opens
through the process of development itself. Most importantly, the state is not a free agent.
The options it chooses and its ability to force results is impacted by its environment.
Perhaps such a charged situation requires small incremental changes at the local level, and
larger, less specific regional actions. In the next section, I will explore a framework within
which physical decisions by the state can be made in the context of the above institutional
limitations.
Implications of Physical Layout Decisions
This section is exploratory and speculative. It draws from diverse literature and proposes a
framework to study the physical implications of the institutional constraints encountered by
incremental development schemes. The section is organized in four parts. In the first part,
I will discuss the opportunities and constraints of physical decision making. The second
part observes the relationship between the state's enforcement powers and objectives, and
the structure of physical plans it promotes. Here, I will take the example of three "new"
city plans-- Chandigarh, New Delhi and Jaipur-- to make my case. The third part will
define the context of development, and study existing prototypical approaches at the scale
of the settlement, neighborhood and plot. The fourth part takes the example of the
Incremental Development Scheme, and derives a set of possible physical objectives from a
list of development goals. These objectives will then be diagrammed, not as definitive
solutions but as illustrations of the advantages and limitations of reducing complex,
diverse, and ephemeral goals into direct, similar, and enduring physical decisions.
* Sequencing Development : Current debates about the role of the state in urban
development, basically defer on whether physical and infrastructure planning should
precede or follow the occupation of land. The protagonists of pre-emptive state
intervention argue that urbanization is wealth producing and hence calls for advanced
planning that organizes and redistributes the gains of urban development (Doebele 85).
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Informal Sub-divisions: Baldia
On the other hand, the opposite position is taken by scholars who argue that planning, not
urbanization is wealth producing, and that the state is in fact responsible for the persistent
decline of opportunities for the poor (Baross 90, Gilbert 90). Therefore, while the first
view would endorse physical planning that opens land for low income shelter, the latter
recommends that the state should defer action until after the poorest, disenfranchised
populace gains (illegal) access to uncontested (undeveloped) land.
However, the case of the Incremental Development Scheme suggests that these views,
instead of being mutually exclusive and irreconcilable, are extremes belonging to a single
continuum of possible relationships between the state and the (informal) market. I argue
that both the above perceptions of urban growth accurately describe facets of urbanization
in fast growing cities in the subcontinent. Whether the state should be involved in planning
urban growth, or how it should be implementing plans, or whom these plans should be
directed towards, are all important questions and must continue to be debated. However,
in the present stressed scenario with exploding demand, the deciding factor is often what
the state can do, rather than what it should do 6 0 . The explicit attempt in the Incremental
Development Scheme to reconcile market and state agendas and abilities, opens the
possibility of considering a reciprocal and iterative planning strategy that both prescribes
development and accommodates initiatives on the ground. This idea is not new. Guided
Land Development, a planning strategy where the state identifies and manages future
growth areas in consultation with existing landowners and occupiers, is already being
practiced in Djakarta, Indonesia. However, this strategy does not need to account for a
situation where the government-- not private interests--owns most of the land on the urban
periphery, as in Hyderabad. Nor does the guided development concept accommodate
(speculative) interests that are likely to follow the development. Most importantly, the
guided land development idea relies upon the enforcement ability of the state, an
assumption that the IDS experience suggests cannot be made easily.
- Reading Notions of State Control: In this part I will examine three "new" city plans
which embody different agendas for exercising state control in their layout. The plans of
all three cities, the democratic state capital Chandigarh, the colonial capital New Delhi, and
the feudal capital Jaipur, suggest that in each case the state perceived its own authority over
60 Baross observes that concurrent with the state's appreciation of the sequence of illegal subdividing
"Occupation> Building> Services> Planning", development agencies have improved their ability to
implement a planning cycle similar to that in the Incremental Development scheme, "Planning>
Occupying> Building > Services" (Baross 90: 77).
the city development to be complete. However, these plans characterize three different
conceptions of the state (Gilbert and Ward 85). In the illustrations, the darker shaded
portions indicate areas of state control.
The Chandigarh plan, adopts the "democratic" (western) grid structure, and assumes direct
state control of streets and civic spaces-- institutions, commercial areas, and green spaces.
This typical representation of the liberal state, accommodates citizens of all income groups
in integrated and undifferentiated privately owned neighborhoods. The Chandigarh plan is
optimistic of the state's ability to protect the interests of the poor, and scarcely envisages
any threats due to conflicts of interest.
Lutyen's colonial plan of New Delhi displays a clearer hierarchy of interest and control.
The deliberate and highly articulated layout of the new extension terminates abruptly,
around a 'cordon sanitaire', a deliberately enforced no-mans-land that separates the old city
(where the natives live) and the capital area (which houses the seat of government and the
residences of its administrators). This illustration of an instrumental state, explicitly
reinforces the interests of the power elite by separating and creating an exclusive and
independent enclave, with clearly controlled access.
The feudal plan of the walled city of Jaipur characterizes the authority of the structuralist
state. Planned in the early eighteenth century as a traders city, and dependent upon the
mobilization of resources of rich traders, the plan of the city exhibits the tenuous authority
of the king. Here, the state controls and constructs the fortifications (around the
perimeter), and the clear hierarchy of streets and public squares (where the commercial
areas are located). Large lots along the main streets were ceded to rich traders and courtiers
invited by the king to participate in the creation of the city. The king controlled all other
lands surrounding the private holdings, thereby retaining absolute control over the elite,
thus fulfilling the dual nature of the structuralist state-- the promotion of the interests of the
elite, but also their control by the state.
- Layout of Contemporary Low Income Settlements: It is curious that at the settlement
level most conventional sites and services projects and many larger illegal subdivisions
internally resemble the open-plan gridded layout of Chandigarh. On the other hand, these
settlements are often introverted and separated from surrounding planned development.
(While the sectors of the IDS are identical to others in the Gulshan-ai-Shahbaz
development, each sector is intended to focus inwards.) Since there is a tendency for such
settlements to take on the characteristics of upper income formal settlements as they mature,
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I conjecture that this introvertedness is a condition for the initiation of a low income
settlement. This introvertedness may be alternatively an indication of the need for such
fledgling settlements to guard against more dominant development interests, or a reflection
of the need for low income groups to identify with each other.
The typical problem with making physical decisions is that they have to be made to a large
extent before any beneficiaries and interest groups are on the ground. The conventional
method of dealing with layouts for low income settlements is to treat it as an efficiency
problem (Caminos and Goethert 78, Bertaud 82). This approach allows the streamlining of
multi-sectoral decision making (financial, engineering, institutional, and architectural), and
illustrates the tradeoffs between cost saving and value maximizing layout options. To a
limited extent, the Bertaud model even deals with issues of fungibility6 1 of land, in the
sense that it can illustrate the financial implications of (say) maximizing the number of
valuable corner lots, and the consequent costs of increased circulation area. Though rarely
used as such, the Bertaud model also allowed for these decisions to be taken in
participatory workshops where prospective users could be asked to make those choices.
While, as in the IDS, the size of neighborhood units have conventionally been determined
by infrastructure staging efficiency criteria, more recent experiences with upgrading
schemes as in Karachi, suggest that clusters of 30 to 50 families are more likely to be able
to take participatory decisions in incremental development 6 2 . Design at the plot level has
been dominated by decisions about plot ratio, and as in the IDS, a concern for enforcing
adequate ventilation and light conditions on each plot (in the IDS, the HDA introduced a
highly inefficient back lane for the purpose). In general, these decisions have been least
enforceable. The prescription of smaller scale layouts has been to minimize common
spaces, on the basis that they increase costs and are least maintainable.
The main shortcoming of this approach is that it views the land itself as a relatively neutral
commodity. Physical planners are put in the position of having to either first-guess the
specific priorities of eventual users, or to rationalize physical decisions on the basis of
larger, more general parameters. In fact, it is this family of problems, that the HDA was
confronting in the Incremental Development Scheme. If as argued previously, it is
expeditious and desirable for the HDA to replace the distribution of freehold tenure with a
range of restrained but more accessible tenure options, then a new agenda for physical
6 1The concept of fungibility recognizes that each piece of land has unique characteristics.
62Arif Hasan, in an interview with the author.
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decisions emerges. Simply, the layout agenda would be to organize and locate different
interests in a mutually reinforcing manner. Researchers agree that the task of land delivery
and management is essentially the description of tenure arrangements that are most capable
of reconciling the contradictions between the public and private natures of land. (Doebele
83).
e Context: The context for new development can either be characterized as one that leads
other development on the urban periphery (as in the Incremental Development Scheme), or
an infill of existing development. Government sponsored low income projects usually
belong to the first category, and illegal subdivisions to the latter. In the following part, I
will concentrate upon the characteristics of state initiated leading development at the
periphery.
* Reconciling Conflicting Development Interests: In consonance with the experience of the
IDS, the three major actors that need to be reconciled in the development are the state, the
dalals, and the users. The accompanying matrix highlights some of the HDA's
development goals and lists possible policy and physical implications. The assumption
here is that the state owns or controls the land in the beginning. This allows the state to
exercise some development controls, at least to begin with. The overall context as in that of
the IDS, is one where the state cannot expect to have total control over the agendas and
actions of different actors. This is represented by the diagram that accepts that the state
would have different of spheres of influence. In areas which it owns, controls, and
manages directly, the state's influence would be the most, and in areas that are owned
privately, its responsibility and ability to control would be relatively less. Therefore, by
recognizing the important features of the interaction of different interests it is possible to
prioritize the areas where the intervention of the state is most desirable, critical, and
feasible.
The advantage (also shortcoming) of layout organization is that a diverse set of goals can be
achieved by a single physical decision. For instance the reception area, which is amenable
to the strongest monitoring by the state, can at once be the physical location for the
coordination of its diverse activities. The reception area could be the location of regional
service distribution, an open access holding area for the poorest, site offices for
development agencies, the commercial and transportation hub, and the focus of community
facilities. The reception area could also be land held in trust by the state or local
government to internalize land value appreciation. By the same reasoning, speculation
would be better monitored by private interests at the periphery of the development, or by
dalals themselves, as was the case in the first phase (sector D-6) of the IDS.
The development energies and the initiative of the dalal can be used to extend services to the
periphery of the settlement. In Hyderabad, this occurred without a plan, in the form of
Shaheen Nagar, an informal settlement at the periphery of the Khuda ki Basti. In normal
circumstances, the dalal would usually wait for the HDA development to happen before he
would develop the outlying areas (as was the case in the IDS). Depending upon the
situation, the HDA could provide incentives to dalals to lead the development (as was
tacitly done in D-6) by implicitly or explicitly ceding land which is adjacent to the new
development but removed from the serviced areas. The logic of locating this ceded
property would be to at once use the dalal to monitor the land the state expects to develop
itself, and to use the dalals initiative to extend services from the service distribution hub at
the reception area, through the state controlled property, and out to the dalal promoted
development. This extension of services would effectively subsidize the cost of trunk
infrastructure for the government controlled land. The sites of future Incremental
Development Schemes, would be open to applicants who undergo a state monitored
screening process through an open access reception area.. For the poorest migrants, this
holding area could also serve to familiarize groups. Perhaps a delivery strategy where
groups of applicants are allotted land as a group, rather than as individuals, could also be
experimented.
The ensemble of different development modes are intended to provide an array of
overlapping and competitive choices. For each unit of state developed sites, three or four
times the land would be released to other developers. The organizing strategy of each
ensemble is the centrally located reception area and amenity center. The relationships
between different development and user groups are reinforced by this strong
interdependency reinforced by location. In sum, the physical strategy would be for the
state to be a catalyst of concentrated growth, leading to a flexible but multi-centric
extension.
There is after all, room for more than one Khuda ki Basti.
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